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METHODS OF ACCOUNTING: THEIR ROLE IN THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW*
J. GLENN HAHNt
Accounting enters financial transactions in the accounts of the
business entity. From these accounts emerge the periodic state-
ments which convey the results of the transactions to management,
stockholders, and creditors. Nominally, at least, the income tax
law also looks to the accounts of the taxpayer-entity for the basic
determination of taxable income. From these same accounts must
come the information which forms the essence of the annual income
tax assessments. A servant to two masters, accounting has not
always performed its Janus-like duties to the satisfaction of all.
The Internal Revenue Code outlines accounting's function with
precision. Taxable income shall be computed on the basis of the
taxpayer's taxable year,' under the method of accounting on the
basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keep-
ing his books.L Items of gross income are to be included in the
gross income for the taxable year in which received by the tax-
payer unless, under the method of accounting used in computing
taxable income, such items are to be properly accounted for as of a
different period., The amount of any deduction or credit shall be
taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under
the method of accounting used in computing taxable income. 4 Con-
cisely, this is the role of accounting methods under the federal
income tax law.
* Portions of this article in their original form were part of a thesis sub-
mitted to Yale University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of the Science of Law.
t Associate, Hoskins, King, Springer & McGannon, Kansas City, Missouri.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 441(a).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(a).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 451(a).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 461(a).
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The simplicity of the statutory terms belies the magnitude of
the assigned task. The language of these sections displays "almost
perfect circuity of reasoning."' And Congress seems largely to have
ignored the fact that concepts of accounting methods have been
slow to develop, indefinite in scope, and hazy of application in the
field of accounting as well as in the federal income tax law. Broadly
defined cash and accrual methods o accounting, as well as several
specialized standards, have provided the basic requirements for the
administration of the law. Income and deductions have fitted
loosely into the slots provided. But where accounting has been short
of usable standards-and this has been often; where accounting
has failed to pervade judicial logic or permeate judicial logger-
heads-and this also has been not infrequent, the Commissioner
and the courts have felt entirely free to erect their own sui generis
structure of debits and credits. The result has been conflict, com-
plaint and confusion.
I. THE ACCOUNTING PERIOD
Accounting long ago assumed the task of reflecting the results
of the financial transactions of a business enterprise over a period
of less than its life. Indeed, accounting "might almost be defined as
the art which attempts to break up the financial history of a busi-
ness unit into specific units, a year or less in length."0 Similarly,
the revenue acts since the sixteenth amendment have consistently
assessed income taxes on the basis of the annual accounting period.7
However, the standards of accounting first developed within the
framework of periodic balance sheet evaluations. Only in recent
decades has accounting thinking been much devoted to the problems
of the periodic matching of costs and revenues. In federal income
5. V. T. H. Bien, 20 T.C. 49, 53 (1953).
6. Paton, Accounting Theory 469 (1922). See also Paton, Recent and Pro-
spective Developments in Accounting Theory, Dickinson Lectures in Accounting
97 (1943). Determination of the profit from operations by periods constitutes
"the crux of the accounting problem." 1 Moonitz & Staehling, Accounting
Analysis 54, 107 (1950).
7. Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934). Pre-1913 acts did
likewise. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6 § 38, 36 Stat. 112; Revenue Act
of 1894, ch. 349 §§ 27-36, 28 Stat. 553; Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 281.
A taxable year must be one for which a tax was in effect, however. Pacific
Wholesalers, Inc. v. Mangerich, 147 F. Supp. 867 (D. Guam 1957).
The experiences of the United States with the income tax prior to the
sixteenth amendment are set forth at length by Kennan, Income Taxation (1910),
and Seligman, The Income Tax (2d ed. 1914). Harry Edwin Smith, The United
States Federal Internal Tax History 1861-1871 (1914), and Todd, Confederate
Finance (1954) describe in detail the tax structures of the two governments dur-
ing and following the Civil War.
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taxation, on the other hand, the sole emphasis has been upon the
periodic determination of income and deductions with little, if any,
regard for accompanying assets and liabilities. Matching as a part
of the taxing process has been largely a matter of association within
a time period. While accounting has emphasized firmly the essen-
tially tentative nature of the annual allocation, the courts and the
Commissioner have been equally insistent upon a definitive, if arti-
ficial, finality, thus glorifying the period of annual reckoning.2
The Taxable Year
In both accounting and the federal income tax law the annual
accounting period was the product of necessity. Nevertheless, the
common maternity yielded few characteristics in common. The
demands of investors and creditors for continuing information on
the status of the enterprise brought forth the periodic accounting
report. The fiscal necessities of the federal government for revenue
capable of being ascertained at regular intervals likewise produced
the annual income tax return. That the standards of the former
have not always proved satisfactory to the latter bespeaks the vary-
ing precepts of the progenitors.
The annual accounting period seemingly was not a basic concept
of medieval bookkeeping. The first accounts of business enterprise
gave small recognition to the periodic determination of income.
Such events as the close of the business venture or the filing of the
records was deemed ample opportunity to strike a balance of entre-
preneurial profit. But with the growth of the industrial economy,
the increased investment of funds, a growing number of venturers,
and lengthening ventures came demands for more frequent account-
ing reports.", To meet them accounting adopted its most trouble-
some convention,1 the accounting period, and the accompanying
concept of the "going concern."'12 It began to devote itself to the
problems of striking an annual balance and of effecting a periodic
8. Paton & Littleton, Corporate Accounting Standards 79 (1940) [hereinafter
cited as Paton & Littleton].
9. See Peragallo, Double Entry Bookkeeping 34 (1938).
10. As Paciolo, the author of the first printed bookkeeping treatise, prudently
pointed out some centuries earlier: "Books should be closed each year, especially
in partnership, because frequent accounting makes for long friendship." De
computis et scripturis, ch. 29, quoted in Geijsbeek, Ancient Double Entry Book-
keeping (1914).
11. Gilman, Accounting Concepts of Profit 73 (1939) [hereinafter cited as
Gilman] ; Littleton, Accounting Evolution ch. 2 (1933) ; see Groves, Trouble Spots
in Taxation 64 (1948).
12. See generally, Gilman ch. 7, The Accounting Period Convention.
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fictitious termination of the business enterprise.13 For many years
the basis of the annual accounting period was the calendar year,
probably because of its significance in an agrarian economy.14 In
the early decades of the twentieth century, however, the account-
ants became active proponents of the "natural business," or fiscal
year.15
The income tax laws traditionally have viewed income as a quan-
tity of receipts, not presently in possession, but flowing over a
period of time.-0 And the chosen interval is not the quarter, the
month, the week, the day, or the hour, but the year." The aim of
the income tax laws is to compel returns from taxpayers in respect
to the income which accrues to them each year.18 The concept of
the taxable year does not encompass particular transactions occur-
ring in a period of less than a year;' 9 taxable income is the sum
total of all the taxpayer's transactions occurring during the twelve-
month period.20 A hybrid system, partly annual and partly trans-
actional, is not authorized by the statute,21 nor does the statute
sanction the deferral of reporting income until a venture is com-
pleted.22 Our system of income taxation operates on the annual
basis.2 3 It is not suggested that there ever has been any other
general scheme for taxing income on any other basis. 24
13. Id. at 96. Periodic reports of profits require that a continuous stream of
activities be viewed, somewhat affectedly perhaps, as a series of time segments.
Bray, The Measurements of Profit, Selected Readings in Accounting 342 (Murphy
ed. 1952).
14. And man still thinks that he must reckon results in terms of the accidental
period involved in the circuit of the earth around the sun. Littleton, Accounting
Evolution 10 (1933).
15. See Sells, The Natural Business Year (1924).
16. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 Atl. 311 (1915).
17. Thorsen v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1933) (dictum); Iron
Mountain Oil Co. v. Alexander, 37 F.2d 231, 233 (10th Cir. 1930).
18. The line is drawn sharply to mark off one tax period from another. Helver-
ing v. National Contracting Co., 69 F.2d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1934). But cf. Orange
See. Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1942).
19. An absence of transactions in the latter part of the taxable year does not
make the income produced by the transactions of the early part any less the
income of the taxable year. Commissioner v. Forest Glen Creamery Co., 98 F.2d
968 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 639 (1939).
20. John F. B. Mitchell, 13 T.C. 368 (1949), rev'd, 187 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1951).
21. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944).
22. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938) ; Commissioner v. Coastvise Transp.
Corp., 71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934); American Indus-
trial Corp., 20 B.T.A. 188 (1930).
23. Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 243 (1955) (dissenting opin-
ion). An annual accounting contemplates (1) an annual accounting of items to a
particular year; (2) an annual classification of items as income, capital, and the
like; and (3) an annual computation, return, and payment of tax. Bartlett v.
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Since 1918 the advantages, both real and otherwise, of the
natural business year25 have been available to both the individual
and the corporate taxpayer2  if the taxpayer keeps books27 on that
Delaney, 75 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1949).
As such it has its problems. The events of a subsequent year are not without
effect via the hindsight route. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952);
Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505, 512 (2d Cir. 1953). Compare the direc-
tion to the Tax Court in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6214 (b) to consider such facts
with relations to the taxes for other years as may be necessary correctly to de-
termine the deficiency of the taxable year. Nor is the federal tax law free of the
knotty legalisms of the effect of a decision determining the tax liability of one
year upon the liability of a subsequent year involving the same issue. See Com-
missioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620
(1933) ; United States v. C. C. Clark, Inc., 159 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 818 (1947); Lore, Res Judicata in the Tax Laws, 34 Taxes 455 (1956).
24. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931). For better or
for worse the federal income tax system is married to the principle of computing
net income on an annual basis. Guardian Inv. Corp. v. Phinney, 253 F.2d 326
(5th Cir. 1958).
The income tax is still sometimes levied over a period of less than twelve
months. A taxpayer may usually select a period of less than one year for its
initial return; it may cut short its taxable year by ceasing to exist. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 443 (a) (2) ; United States v. Kingman, 170 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.
1948) ; C. Standlee Martin, Inc. v. Riddell, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1376 (S.D. Cal.
1956). The Commissioner may terminate the taxable year of a taxpayer who
designs quickly to depart from the United States or commits certain heinous acts
tending to render ineffectual proceedings to collect his income tax. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 6851 (a); see Rogan v. Mertens, 153 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1946). The
regulations may authorize other than an annual accounting period if necessary
to clearly reflect income, e.g., the long-term contract methods. Daley v. United
States, 243 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 (1957); Deer Island
Logging Co., 14 B.T.A. 1027 (1929); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957). In some
instances the annual measurement of income may be impossible. Virginia Iron
Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 630 (1939).
25. That is, the taxpayer may report income on the basis of a twelve-month
period ending December 31 (the calendar year) or on the basis of a twelve-
month period ending on the last day of any month other than December (the fiscal
year). Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 441(d), 441(e). A period ending on a date
other than the last day of the month is not an annual accounting period and hence
requires the computation of income on a calendar year basis. Rev. Rul. 273,
1954-2 Cum. Bull 110; cf. infra note 29.
In Wankinco Bog Co., 16 B.T.A. 386 (1929), the Board chided the taxpayer
for using the "primitive accounting" of the calendar year, and thus "artificially
segregating" the financial affairs of its cranberry business. But cf. Jacob F.
Brown, 18 B.T.A. 859, 868 (1930).
26. Under the Revenue Act of 1916 corporations keeping their books on a fiscal
year basis had the option of reporting income accordingly. Ch. 463, § 13 (a), 39
Stat. 770. The 1913 Act and the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 provided
that income be computed on a calendar-year basis. Ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 167
(1913) ; Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 114 (1909). The Revenue Act of 1918 required any
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basis within the territorial limits of the United States. 2  By keep-
ing his books and electing to compute income accordingly, a tax-
payer may now take advantage of a more contemporary accounting
phenomenon, the thirteen-month year.29 A new taxpayer entity"0
taxpayer keeping his accounts on a fiscal year basis to make his returns on that
basis. Bradstreet Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1933); Henry D.
Weed, 2 B.T.A. 84 (1925); G.C.M. 1113, VI-1 Cum. Bull. 178 (1927).
Filing returns on the basis of another taxable year has no significance; it is
the taxable year used by the taxpayer in keeping his books which is controlling.
Helvering v. Brooklyn City R.R., 72 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1934); Great West Print-
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1932); Jonas-Cadillac Co. v.
Commissioner, 41 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1930), affirming 16 B.T.A. 932 (1929); Atlas
Oil & Ref. Corp., 17 T.C. 733 (1951); Rev. Rul. 256, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 215.
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 441(g) (1). The Commissioner has interpreted
this requirement rather strictly, although "the reason, necessity, or justification
for [it] may not be too obvious." Louis M. Brooks, 6 T.C. 504, 508 (1946); see
Malcolm G. Brooks, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 168 (1946). But cf. Cohan v. Commis-
sioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Max H. Stryker, 36 B.T.A. 326 (1937). Per-
haps some relaxation may be expected. The 1954 Code committee reports state
that the statute is not intended to impose any requirement that the records be
bound. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 299 (1954). Under the regulations
the keeping of records which adequately and clearly reflect income for the taxable
year constitutes the keeping of books within the meaning of § 441(g). Treas.
Reg. § 1.441-1(g) (1957).
The books of a partnership are not the books of the partner so as to enable
the partner to report on a fiscal year basis. Klempner v. Glenn, 82 F. Supp. 626
(W.D. Ky. 1949); Fred R. Drake, 1 B.T.A. 1235 (1925).
28. Linen Thread Co., 14 T.C. 725 (1950); Max Freudmann, 10 T.C. 775
(1948).
29. Or, more accurately, the 52-53 week accounting period. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 441(f). Thus the taxpayer may adopt a period ending on the last Friday
in March each year or whatever Friday falls nearest to March 31 each year. The
52-53 week year is common in certain industries, e.g., retail sales, meat packing,
radio and television. S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 27, at 66.
For some years the courts refused to recognize the 52-53 week period. See
Parks-Chambers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1942); Swift & Co.
v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 171, 38 F.2d 365 (1930); J. W. Vaughan, 19 B.T.A.
478 (1930). In 1952 the Commissioner, in a statement before the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation, had indicated that the Service accepted returns
based upon a 52-week year where the practice of the taxpayer in using such an
accounting period was of long standing. See 5 CCH 1952 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
1 6169.
30. A status not acquired by marriage, by the revival of a long-dormant cor-
poration, a complete change of corporate stock ownership, nor less than a sub-
stantial change in the terms of the partnership agreement. See Theriot v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); American
Coast Line, Inc. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1947) ; East Coast Motors,
Inc., 35 B.T.A. 212 (1936); cf. Gill v. United States, 258 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1958).
Compare Rose Mary Hash, 4 T.C. 878, aff'd on other grounds, 152 F.2d 722 (4th
Cir. 1945), with Vera Melin Britz, 14 T.C. 1094 (1950). A revocable trust, the
income of which is taxed to the grantor during lifetime but which becomes ir-
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generally 1 is free to choose its own taxable year to its advantage.2
Once adopted, however, the taxable year cannot be changed without
the consent of the Commissioner," although the proposed period
revocable at death, becomes a new entity for this purpose at date of death even
though fiduciary returns have been filed during the grantor's lifetime. Rev. Rul.
51, 1957-1 Cure. Bull. 171.
31. A partnership may not change to, or adopt a taxable year other than that
of all its principal partners unless it establishes to the satisfaction of the Com-
missioner a business purpose therefor. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 706(b) (1).
An individual operating a proprietorship and keeping books must report his
nonbusiness income on the same basis as that on which his business accounts are
kept. James H. Silcox, 12 B.T.A. 748 (1928); O.D. 941, 4 Cum. Bull. 71 (1921);
O.D. 289, 1 Cum. Bull. 62 (1919); cf. J. T. Pittard, 5 B.T.A. 755 (1926); Rev.
Rul. 389, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 298.
32. And sometimes to its mathematical disadvantage, with "straddling" revenue
acts. See generally Holzman, Calendar v. Fiscal Year, 20 Taxes 211 (1942).
Filing a Form 7004, Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S.
Corporation Income Tax Return, and payment of the installment shown as due
thereon, may constitute a selection of accounting period prior to the time the
actual return is filed. Rev. Rul. 589, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 298.
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 442. If a taxpayer keeps no books of account and
adopts an annual accounting period other than the calendar year, he shall be
treated as having changed his annual accounting period. Ibid. To secure prior
approval the taxpayer must file application on Form 1128 on or before the last
day of the month following the close of the short period for which a return is
required to effect the change of accounting period. In general, a change will be
approved where the taxpayer establishes a substantial business purpose for mak-
ing the change. Treas. Reg. § 1.442-1(b) (1957).
Under Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.46-1(b) (1953), no permission was required for a
taxpayer to change his accounting period if the short taxable year resulting from
the change ended after June 30, 1953, and none of the following conditions existed:
(1) the taxpayer had changed his accounting period within the previous five
years; (2) the short taxable year required to effect the change ended more than
three months and less than nine months after the close of the existing accounting
period; or (3) the taxpayer's net income for the short taxable year required to
effect the change, as annualized, was less than 80% of the income of the taxpayer
for the immediately preceding taxable year. The new regulations permit a cor-
poration to change its annual accounting period without permission if: (1) it has
not adopted or changed its accounting period within the previous ten years (this
requirement is not applicable to corporations which have been in existence for
sixty months or less) ; (2) the short period required by the change is not one in
which the corporation has a net operating loss; (3) the taxable income for the
short period placed on an annual basis is 80% or more of the taxable income of
the corporation for the immediately preceding taxable year; and (4) the corpora-
tion would not, for the short period, have a different status than the status it had
for the immediately preceding taxable year (i.e., as one subject to the accumulated
earnings tax, a personal holding company, an exempt corporation, a Western
Hemisphere trade corporation, or a China Trade Act corporation). Special pro-
visions are applicable to subsidiary corporations, as under the prior regulations,
and to a newly married husband or wife adopting the same taxable year of the
other spouse in order to file a joint return. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.442-1(c), (d), (e)
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would more clearly reflect income.34 Even in the presence of these
statutory frills, the taxable year is normally the calendar year.",
The concept of the annual accounting period for federal income
tax purposes has been much criticized. Despite due denunciations,"0
constructive criticism, 3 and proposed panaceas, 3' the taxable year
seems destined to remain the primary accounting period. It is the
basis upon which business is generally conducted.3 0 From the view-
point of the national fise it meets the primary requirements of pro-
ducing revenue ascertainable and payable to the Government at regu-
(1957). The new regulations are effective for changes in accounting periods where
the short taxable year occasioned thereby ends on and after March 1, 1957. Treas.
Reg. § 1.442-1(f) (1957).
If a taxpayer does not request permission to change his accounting period, but
files returns on a new basis, the Commissioner may disapprove the change and
compute income on the old basis, or accept the returns on a changed basis, and
thus evidence his approval. Jonas-Cadillac Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 141
(7th Cir. 1930), affirming 16 B.T.A. 932 (1929); Andrew John Williamson, 22 T.C.
684, 686 (1954); Clark Brown Grain Co., 18 B.T.A. 937 (1930); cf. Greylock
Mills v. Blair, 293 Fed. 846 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Does "only" in § 442 change this
rule? Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 46, 53 Stat. 26.
34. Bradstreet Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1933). The "clearly
reflect income" requirement does not refer to the taxpayer's annual accounting
period but only to the "method of accounting." Clara A. McKee, 11 B.T.A. 1381,
1386 (1928).
35. Van der Elst v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1955).
36. Annual income tax accounting makes crucially important for Treasury
and taxpayer many hard (or impossible) questions as to the precise allocation of
income between years--questions which lead to interminable disputes, hearings,
and litigations and which, under a good system, would be of no real importance
to either party. Now in a good tax law such imputations in time, by legalistic
jargon and legerdemain, would be of no consequence to the taxpayer or Treasury.
Simon, Federal Tax Reform 31, stated in part in Groves, Production, Jobs and
Taxes 84 (1944).
37. While the year is the most logical unit of time for income tax purposes, it
is unsatisfactory because: (1) it is not possible to determine with accuracy the
specific year in which certain items of income and deduction should be accounted
for; (2) the incomes of most people are not stable from year to year. Blough,
The Federal Taxing Process 319 (1952).
38. Recommendations generally include longer accounting periods, actual or
constructive, by extending the reporting period, or averaging of income over a
period of years. Of these, only the last has found corporeal favor as one of
"certain ameliorations of the unduly drastic consequences of such a system in its
rigid form." Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 244 (1955) (dissenting
opinion); see Int. Rev, Code of 1954, § 172. See also Darrell, How Long Should
the Accounting Period Be for Corporate Income Tax Purposes, in How Should
Corporations Be Taxed 135 (1947).
39. Iron Mountain Oil Co. v. Alexander, 37 F.2d 231, 233 (10th Cir. 1930).
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lar intervals." Taxes are not, after all, collected, or probably col-
lectible, upon the basis of complete theoretical accuracy; this Pro-
crustean bed is probably no more uncomfortable than the next.4'
Matching Costs and Revenues
Accounting's prior recognition of the problems of the annual ac-
counting period gave it no well-grounded superiority over the federal
income tax law in the measurement of annual income. It gave rise
instead to a series of postulates for the valuation of assets and lia-
bilities at the end of the accounting period. The demands of the users
of the periodic accounting reports, together with the techniques de-
veloped by accounting to meet those demands, apparently contributed
to the prominence of "balance sheet" accounting.
As accounting was beginning to outgrow its early function as a
source of information for management alone,4' industrial development
in the United States was undergoing a period of wide expansion.
Large scale manufacturing was being undertaken by many growing
corporations. While some of the capital needs were being supplied by
individual investors,, bankers and creditors remained prominent in
corporate financing." The latter group was wont to look largely to
the corporate balance sheets as security. So long as the creditors
operated upon this "pounce" theory, the balance sheet was the most
important financial statement because it placed emphasis upon the
liquidation of the enterprise. ;
40. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
41. Bartlett v. Delaney, 75 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Mass. 1948). And adminis-
trative convenience and fiscal necessities are greatly served thereby. Magill, Tax-
able Income 221 (1936 ed.).
42. And to assume "broad social responsibilities." Paton & Littleton. The
United States Steel's report to its stockholders in 1902, rendered by Price, Water-
house & Company, is generally deemed to be the first accounting report to a large
group of "public" stockholders. Murphy, Selected Readings in Accounting 169
(1952).
43. The Liberty Loan issues floated during World War I developed a great
host of small individual investors. That the masses in cities and rural regions
might "dwell in the effulgence of the golden glow," in the early 1920's leaders in
business enterprise offered stocks and bonds to investors and country banks. Young
men, fresh from academic groves, Bachelors of Arts in one thing or another, were
recruited by the tens of thousands and drilled into rank and file salesmen for the
highways and the byways. Beard, America In Midpassage 11-17 (1946).
44. The first active work in the promulgation of accounting and auditing
standards was done under the auspices of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1917.
See Federal Res. Bd., Uniform Accounting-A Tentative Proposal (1917).
45. Blough, Accounting Principles, CPA Handbook 17-5 (Kane ed. 1952). Al-
though then widely accepted, the liquidation theory is contra to another of account-
ing's most time-honored conventions, "the going-concern." See Paton & Littleton 9.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Accounting's efforts during this time thus were devoted chiefly to
the proper statement of the balance sheet as of the close of the year,
to the almost entire exclusion of the income statement. As a means
both of limiting the audit fee and supplying only the requisite infor-
mation, accountants, beginning about 1910 and chiefly from 1918,
developed the "balance-sheet audit," an examination in which the
income accounts were given only cursory examination.- Income was
viewed, if at all, only incidentally, as the change in net worth on suc-
cessive balance sheets.4 7 And for a great many years, the federal in-
come tax law notwithstanding, the balance sheet remained the chief
financial accounting statement.4 8
Sometime between the two World Wars accounting came to the
gradual awakening that its primary task lay not in a periodic valua-
tion of assets, but in the measurement of income.4D While this reve-
lation did not stem from any particular date or event, it seems most
likely that it gathered impetus in the early 1930's and was widely
accepted prior to 1941. 50 Statements issued by the American Account-
ing Association in 19365, and by the Committee on Accounting Pro-
cedure of the American Institute of Accountants in 193812 evinced the
46. The development of the balance sheet audit temporarily counteracted those
forces which normally would have shifted accounting emphasis to the profit and
loss statement much sooner. Gilman 37.
47. As a matter of accounting theory, net income may be proven by an analysis
of surplus alone, if the balance sheets involved in the analysis of surplus are
correct. Wernecke-Schnitz Hardware Co., 2 B.T.A. 914 (1925). This concept is
not out of harmony with a technique of constructive accounting popular today with
the Internal Revenue Service, viz., the net worth method. See infra note 174.
48. The continued popularity of the balance sheet seemingly was attributable
to the creditor emphasis in accounting, the legal emphasis upon property rights,
equities, and values, and the early concern of investors for the "underlying assets"
represented by their corporate stocks. 1 Newlove & Garner, Advanced Accounting
393-94 (1951); Gilman ch. III, The New Emphasis on Profits.
49. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
which gave the SEC the power to prescribe the form and contents of registration
statements to be filed with the Commission, and the hearings attendant thereto,
may have convinced the accounting profession that it was not performing to the
fullest extent its "broad social responsibilities." See Frank, The Sin of Perfection-
ism, Papers, 53d Annual Meeting, American Institute of Accountants 97-113
(1940).
50. See Couchman, The Balance Sheet 3 (1924) ; Prickett & Mikesell, Principles
of Accounting 3 (1937); Study Group, Changing Concepts of Business Income 60
(1952); Gilman preface.
51. American Accounting Ass'n, A Tentative Statement of Accounting Prin-
ciples, 11 Accounting Rev. 187, 188 (1936).
52. American Institute of Accountants, Examination of Financial Statements 4
(1936). See Littleton, Concepts of Income Underlying Accounting, 12 Accounting
Rev. 13 (1937).
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changing accounting perspective. In 1940 accounting writers were
busy noting the transition5
The shift in emphasis resulted not so much from a change of ac-
counting observers as from a change in the requirements of existing
users. Creditors began to rely more upon the ability of their debtors
to pay their obligations out of current income and less upon liquida-
tion values.5 4 A widening group of creditors and stockholders likewise
gave support to the income statement doctrine.55 With the ascendance
of the income statement, the balance sheet in turn became the con-
necting link between successive income statements.",
The change in accounting emphasis from the balance sheet to the
income statement, however belated, wrought corresponding changes
in accounting thought. The primary problem was no longer one of
valuation, but of the allocation of historical costs and revenues to
current and succeeding accounting periods. Viewing the income state-
ment as primary meant that the principal concern of accounting was
the periodic matching of costs and revenues,57 i.e., the bringing into
association in the present the revenues identified with the present, and
bringing into association in the future the revenues identified with
the future and their related costs.158 The matching process became
fundamental to accounting activity.5 9
Basically, the concept of matching costs and revenues is a simple
process. The stream of business activity is divided into two elements,
53. 1 Newlove & Garner, op. cit. supra note 48.
54. Blough, Accounting Principles, CPA Handbook 17-5 (Kane ed. 1952); Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure, Accounting Research Bull. No. 30 (1947).
55. See Moyer & Mautz, Functional Accounting 35-36 (2d ed. 1951); Bailey,
The Increasing Significance of the Income Statement, Selected Readings in Ac-
counting 148 (Murphy ed. 1952). The role of the federal income tax law in the
evolution, if existent, was ethereal.
56. Committee on Accounting Procedure, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43 at 7 (1953); Study Group, Chang-
ing Concepts in Business Income 60 (1952); 1 Newlove & Garner, op. cit. supra
note 48, at 394. In 1947, George 0. May was of the opinion that the time was
apropos for a consideration of the usefulness of the balance sheet, and the possi-
bility of substituting another statement. May, The Future of the Balance Sheet,
84 J. Accountancy 98 (1947). Every movement seemingly must have its reactiona-
ries. See Werntz, The Resurgence of the Balance Sheet As a Useful Element in
Financial Analysis, 96 J. Accountancy 555 (1953).
57. Paton & Littleton 7; Study Group, op. cit. supra note 56, at 28.
58. Littleton, Suggestions for the Revision of the Tentative Statement of
Accounting Principles, 14 Accounting Rev. 57, 60 (1939).
59. Ascher, Survey of Accounting 467-68 (1952) ; Karrenbrock & Simons, Inter-
mediate Accounting 6 (2d ed. 1953); Mason, Stenberg & Niven, Elementary
Accounting 358 (1951); Moyer & Mautz, Functional Accounting 23 (2d ed. 1951);
Werntz, The Influence of Changing Tax Rates on Accounting and Auditing Pro-
cedures, 28 Taxes 658 (1950).
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the acquisition of goods and services required for the performance of
its objectives, resulting in business costs, and the accomplishment
of its objectives to recover costs plus a profit resulting in business
revenue. The net income for a specified period is to be determined by
matching costs against revenues.6 0 The accountant has merely to
ascertain the related money outgoings which promoted the current
money incomings; the difference between the two is the profit for the
period.0 1
The seeming simplicity of the task is nonetheless beguiling. Assign-
ment of costs and revenues to periods can be made in absolute terms
,only if all costs and revenues are evidenced by the flow of cash02 But
it is plain that in most businesses there are likely to be current out-
goings which are not immediately consummated by current incom-
ings . 3 Objective standards thus are necessary to guide the matching
of costs and revenues not so evidenced. 4 However objective the
standards adopted," costs and revenues matched in accordance with
them are indirect,66 and to that extent, the correctness of the directly
calculated accrual becomes quantitatively impairedr7 The matching
60. Karrenbrock & Simons, Intermediate Accounting 6 (2d ed. 1953); Paton &
Littleton 16.
61. Bray, The Measurement of Profit, Selected Readings in Accounting 342
(Murphy ed. 1952).
62. 1 Moonitz & Staehling, Accounting Analysis 150 (1950); Sanders, Progress
in the Development of Basic Concepts, in Contemporary Accounting 1-15 (Leland
ed. 1945).
63. Bray, op. cit. supra note 61, at 343.
64. Holmes & Meier, Elementary Accounting 521 (1949); Paton & Littleton
119; see Fitzgerald, Current Accounting Trends 40 (1952). Out of this necessity
has arisen a body of conventions, based on a combination of theoretical and prac-
tical considerations, which form the basis for the determination of income and the
preparation of the balance sheet. American Institute of Accountants, Examination
of Financial Statements 2 (1936).
65. Generally, accounting has adopted only the tenets that only realized income
be recognized and that it be offset by all costs, expenses, and losses, realized or
unrealized, insofar as "they can be practically related to the same accounting
period" (despite the fact that the recognition of unrealized losses is contrary to the
matching concept). Gilman 13.
66. Standards for the determination of income and cost are equally difficult.
Once the cash basis for revenue is abandoned, a choice must be exercised by alter-
native bases of measurement, which are equally verifiable or equally unverifiable.
While a number of standards for the assignments of costs to a period exists, e.g.,
physical expiration, expiration over a period of time, there is no directly traceable
relationship between the value amounts assigned to periodic costs and those as-
signed to periodic revenues. The problem might be more simple if it were a matter
of measuring revenues alone or costs alone; measuring them in relation to each
other adds to the complications. Sanders, op. cit. supra note 62; 1 Moonitz &
Staehling, op. cit. supra note 62, at 192-96; Paton & Littleton 15.
67. 1 Moonitz & Staehling, op. cit. supra note 62, at 150.
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of costs and revenues by periods is in itself a measure of expediency,
and hence involves possibilities of errors.6 ' While the primary pur-
pose of matching costs and revenues is clear on its face, its effectua-
tion in practice is, as usual, attended by many difficulties.6 9 The
utopian standard of matching each unit of expired cost against each
unit of revenue does not appear likely of achievement.70
Absent statutory recognition and left largely to fend for itself, the
matching process, like some other accounting techniques, has fended
badly in the law of federal income taxation. While its early recog-
nition may have been hampered by constitutional problems 7 1 the
bodies administering the federal tax law have shown no great rush to
embrace its theories in the years since the 1913 problems have faded.7 2
The Board of Tax Appeals recognized the desirability of balancing
against income the expenses of producing that income, but was of the
opinion that this concept necessarily must be subordinated to the
scheme of annual taxation."3 Income need not necessarily be accrued
because expenses are deducted in that year.7 4 Those seeking to delay
the return of income on the grounds that expenditures will be required
in future years which should be offset against that income generally
have been unsuccessful. 75 Installment basis taxpayers are required to
68. Id. at 192.
69. Sanders, op. cit. supra note 62.
70. 1 Newlove & Garner, Advanced Accounting 416 (1951). The doctrine of
matching costs and revenues is not to be confused with, or complicated by, that
specialized field of accounting known as "cost accounting." While matching costs
and revenues, in financial accounting, refers to the inclusion of items of cost and
revenue in the same accounting period, cost accounting is the process of ascer-
taining the cost of manufacturing a particular product or rendering a service,
usually through the use of techniques known as job order costing (for large items
of production) and process cost (for small items produced in large quantities).
Cost accounting assumes a flow of both identifiable costs and an allocable portion
of unidentifiable costs from the acquisition to the sale of finished product. It has
been said to give "a fictitious appearance of accuracy." See Gilman 125-27; 1
Newlove & Garner, Advanced Accounting 414 (1951); Vance, Techniques of Cost
Accounting (1952); Blocker, Essentials of Cost Accounting (1950).
71. But see Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 13 B.T.A. 988, 1029 (1928), rev'd, 47 F.2d
990 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931).
72. The view that the accrual method of accounting was to embrace the match-
ing concept seems to have faded. See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 437
(1926); cf. Reiling, Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Accounting, 30 Taxes 1028,
1033-34 (1952). a
73. Buffalo Union Furnace Co., 23 B.T.A. 439, 462 (1931), aff'd in part, 72
F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1934).
74. Breeze Corps. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 261, 117 F. Supp. 404 (1954).
But see Pacific Grape Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862, 868 (9th Cir.
1955) ; Shelby Salesbook Co. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
75. See Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957);
Streight Radio & TeleVision, Inc., 33 T.C. No. 15 (Oct. 26, 1959); H. J. Irby,
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deduct expenses in the year in which paid or incurred, regardless of
the year in which the income is collected.7a Taxable income is ascer-
tained by assembling all the profit and transactions of the period; any
other matching is pure happenstance."
A Tentative Determination
The rising prominence of the income statement and its accompany-
ing emphasis on the matching of costs and revenues have not fostered
an accounting concept of income determinable by rules and principles
that are "as precise, objective, and impartial as mathematics."" To
the contrary, accounting has always tempered its doctrines with the
realization that each accounting period is not within itself a definitive
measure of income79 The failure of the interpreters of the federal
income tax statutes similarly to assuage the finality of the annual
ascertainment of taxable income seemingly must be regarded as
judicial rejection of accounting as is, and the adoption of that which
the courts, in their opiated opinion, would like accounting to be.
Accountants are fully cognizant of the fact that no absolute
measurement of profit is possible until the enterprise is at an end. 0
All measures of income for less than the duration of the enterprise
are approximate indexes only81 They are mere tentative installments
in the record of long-term financial iesults, at best interim reports.2
Business enterprise is a continuous stream of activities, with those of
30 T.C. 1166 (1958); Your Health Club, 4 T.C. 385 (1944). But see Bayshore
Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1959), reversing 30 T.C. 1292;
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959); Beacon
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1955); Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 455, added by the 1958 Technical Amendments Act, permitting the
deferral of "prepaid" subscription income.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(c) (1958); Sally K. Frankenstein, 31 T.C. No. 43
(Nov. 20, 1958) ; A. Finkenberg's Sons, Inc., 17 T.C. 973, 982 (1951).
77. It cuts altogether too fine to say that true, and therefore taxable, income
can only be ascertained in this manner. Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 325
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 704 (1937).
78. Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, A Tax Program for a Solvent America
87 (1945).
79. It cannot be considered to measure a twelve-month "venture" that "bought"
its assets from the prior period and will "sell" its assets to the next period. Paton
& Littleton 9.
80. Committee on Auditing Procedure, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Statements on Auditing Procedures No. 1, at 10 (1939); Fitzgerald,
Current Accounting Trends 40.
81. Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, op. cit. supra note 78; Canning, Eco-
nomics of Accountancy 65 (1929).
82. Committee on Accounting Procedure, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, at 41, 59 (1953).
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the moment conditioned by those of the past, and in turn, conditioning
those of the future.83
Except in rare instances, however, it is impossible to await the
termination of an enterprise to measure its profits s4 Allocation to
fiscal periods must be made. It is in this process that accounting be-
comes something less precise than mathematics. Many items of in-
come and deduction will be so clearly associated with the period as to
raise no question. But many others will be applicable to past or
future periods, or their allocations will be in doubt.85 While the prin-
ciples of accounting furnish a guide for the treatment of the areas
of doubt,16 the results must always contain many estimates and ap-
proximations.- Those who understand accounting well admit that
an accounting estimate is at best a reasonable approximation, and
sometimes only a very rough approximationY' The assignment of
costs and revenues to a period involves an appreciable quantity of
opinion and individual judgment.5 The judgment of other men,
equally honest and competent, surveying the same economic phe-
nomena may differ, perhaps sharply.90
The process of breaking the stream of business activity into fiscal
segments, for each of which reports are prepared, severs many real
connections and tends to give a specious color of immediate reliability
to data which in substantial measure depend on the course of future
events. 1 It is this specious color upon which the taxing authorities
have seized in the annual levy of the income tax. They never have
faced squarely the axiom that annual-income accounting is and should
be tentative and provisional.2 Present and past law, while embracing
accounting practice, highlights its infirmities and pardonable short-
comings and leans ponderously upon the empty spaces of its lacunae.
It seeks a precision and finality in inherently provisional determina-
tions, an insistence "which can only drive accountants into distraction,
courts into sophistries, and tax lawyers into pestilential multiplica-
tion."'" The taxing authorities seek a determination of "true in-
83. Paton & Littleton 9.
84. Fitzgerald, op. cit. supra note 80.
85. Sanders, Hatfield & Moore, A Statement of Accounting Principles 25-26
(1938).
86. Ibid.; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Audits by Certi-
fied Public Accountants 12 (1950).
87. Committee on Auditing Procedure, op. cit. supra note 80.
88. Ascher, Survey of Accounting 688 (1952).
89. See Fitzgerald, op. cit. supra note 80, at 40-42.
90. Kaplan & Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders and the SEC,
48 Yale L.J. 935, 942 (1939).
91. Paton & Littleton 9.
92. Simons, Federal Tax Reform 60 (1950).
93. Id. at 59.
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come" , from accounting, but never take cognizance of the fact that
"true" in accounting terminology means the most accurate profit
figure obtainable under the circumstances.9 5 They would do well to
recognize that "Taxation, like business, is a going concern; a single
separate tax period is not the climax and end of the taxing process.' "
I. METHODS OF ACCOUNTING
The statutory prescription that taxable income be computed in
accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the
taxpayer in keeping his books generally has been construed as giving
the taxpayer a choice between reporting income as received and de-
ductions when paid or income when accrued and deductions when
incurred. Once selected, the method must be consistently followed
unless permission is given to change. Only if the accounts clearly
reflect the income are they determinative of the taxpayer's liability.
"The" Methods of Accounting
Under the Revenue Act of 1913 the taxpayer was required to report
income on a cash basis.9 7 The Revenue Act of 1916 gave him the
94. See Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2 (b) (1953).
95. 1 Newlove & Garner, Advanced Accounting 403 (1951).
96. Blough, The Role of Accounting in the Taxing Process, 22 Accounting Rev.
248, 251 (1947).
97. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16 § 2, 38 Stat. 166. The statutory requirement
was at best somewhat illusory in the case of corporate taxpayers, however, inas-
much as the regulations expressly provided that manufacturing companies should
compute their income by the use of inventories and should include income, gains
or profits from all other sources as shown by the books of account. Deductions
except for taxes and losses could be evidenced either by actual disbursements in
cash or evidenced in such other way as to be properly acknowledged by the cor-
porate officers and entered on the books of the corporation so as to constitute a
liability. Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 104, 158 (1914). Since all books of account in
businesses of any magnitude were kept on an accrual basis, the law probably
could not have been administered in any other way. Aluminum Castings Co. v.
Routzalm, 24 F.2d 230, 231 (N.D. Ohio 1927).
This unusual state of affairs was doubtless a direct outgrowth of the skirmish
between law and accounting which accompanied the enactment of the Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909, 36 Stat. 112. The Excise Tax Act sought to levy a tax
measured by corporate net income, which was to be ascertained, according to the
statute, by deducting from gross income received during the calendar year all
expenses actually paid. When the bill was before Congress, the accounting pro-
fession waged a vigorous encounter with the Attorney General, alleging that the
cash-basis, calendar-year concept violated all accepted principles of accounting
and would be absolutely impossible of application. Although the accountants
ostensibly lost on both counts, the regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury, with the advice of the vanquished, encompassed the accrual concept of
income. See Treas. Reg. 31, art. 2, § 5; art. 4, § 8 (1909); Adams, When Is
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option of reporting income upon the cash basis or upon any basis
other than actual receipts or disbursements if it clearly reflected in-
come. 9s The Revenue Act of 1918 required the taxpayer to compute
income in accordance with the method of accounting regularly em-
ployed in keeping his books.9 Thus, the taxpayer's method of ac-
counting has been the criterion for the computation of taxable income
for more than forty years.' 0 No particular named method is required
by the statute and, prior to the 1954 Code,110 no name was given to
the method employed; it only had clearly to reflect income. 10
Accountants have long been insistent that the purpose of the enact-
ment of section 212 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, and its substan-
tive re-enactment in subsequent legislation, was to require the deter-
mination of taxable income in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles,0 " rather than merely to set forth alternatives
between the cash and accrual bases of accounting. Their position has
some merit. The term "basis" of accounting, and particularly, "cash
basis" and "accrual basis" had then begun to assume some accounting
Income Realized?, in The Federal Income Tax 32 (Haig ed. 1921); May, Twenty-
five Years of Accounting Responsibility 2:276 (1936). See generally Machen, The
Federal Corporation Tax Law (1910).
98. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8(g), 13(d), 39 Stat. 763-771; Helvering
v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636, 643 (1941). The difficulty if not the utter impossibility
of preparing a return upon a strict basis of cash receipts and disbursements
constituted the reason and necessity for the enactment of the statute. Aluminum
Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 31 F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 1929).
99. Revenue Act of 1919, ch. 18, §§ 212(b), 232, 40 Stat. 1064, 1077; Charles A.
Collin, 1 B.T.A. 305, 311 (1925) ; see Treas. Reg. 45, art. 24 (1919).
100. Section 212(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 proved long-lived, viz.:
Section Revenue Act Statutes at Large
212(b) 1918 40 Stat. 1064
212(b) 1921 42 Stat. 237
212(b) 1924 43 Stat. 267
212 (b) 1926 44 Stat. 23
41 1928 45 Stat. 805
41 1932 47 Stat. 185
41 1934 48 Stat. 694
41 1936 49 Stat. 1666
41 1938 52 Stat. 473
and § 41 of Int. Rev. Code of 1939. Section 446 of the 1954 Code merely "rear-
ranged and clarified" the tenets of § 41 of the 1939 Code. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 834 (1954).
101. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446 (c).
102. Planet Line, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1937).
103. May, foreword to Smith & Butters, Taxable and Business Income xix
(1949); Lasser, Tax Accounting Methods 25 (1951); May, Tax Accounting v.
Business Accounting, 79 J. Accountancy 323 (1945).
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significance. °4 "Basis" was the terminology of the 1916 Act. 01  Had
Congress intended only that the taxpayer might use either the cash
or the accrual basis, it may well be argued that the law-making body
would have specifically so provided. It is not apparent that the phrase
"method of accounting" then had any particular accounting signifi-
cance, however.2° Nor had accounting promulgated, or even proposed,
any "systematic methods of accrual and expiry"'01 7 for the assignment
of income and expenses to particular accounting periods. It was then
chiefly concerned, as has been previously mentioned, with the prob-
lems of balance-sheet valuation. Moreover, accounting was more in-
clined to the view that the conditions of business required "the most
elastic adjustments to their necessities and needs, [and] within the
bonds of reason, accounting should be permitted to adjust itself to
those needs."108 Income should, in other words, be that amount of in-
come which accountants, in the exercise of their business judgment,
seasoned experience, and expert opinion determined that it should
be. 09
Having their own expert opinions, the taxing administrators under-
standably sought income criteria more nearly within their own do-
104. The "basis" nomenclature appears to have been more popular in account-
ing than "method." See Bennett, Advanced Accounting 22 (1922); Kohler, Ac-
counting Theory as Affected by Federal Income Taxation, III Papers and Pro-
ceedings, 7th Annual Meeting, American Ass'n of Univ. Instructors in Accounting
73 (1923); Accountant's Handbook 114 (Paton ed. 1946); Kester, Advanced
Accounting 9-11 (1946); cf. Holmes, Advanced Accounting 198-99 (1947); 1 New-
love & Garner, Advanced Accounting 403 (1951). Although the courts have some-
times used the label "systems" of accounting to refer to the cash and accrual
alternatives, Eckert v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1930); National
Builders, Inc., 12 T.C. 852 (1949), the term has been customarily used in the
accounting field to denote that branch of the art devoted to the prescription of
accounting procedures and design of accounting forms. This area has in recent
years branched out into something somewhat more grandiosely described as
"management services." See Bailey, Specialized Accounting Systems 1-2 (1951);
Willard, System Building and Constructive Accounting (1922); Wellington, The
Development of Management Services, 101 J. Accountancy 57 (1956).
105. See supra note 98.
106. The two basic methods of accounting were described by Kester as
"analysis" and "synthesis." Rorem used "method" in the title of his text, seem-
ingly in lieu of "principles" and not in any way distinguished therefrom. See
1 Kester, Accounting Theory and Practice ch. XXXII (1917); Rorem, Accounting
Method (1928).
107. Bray, The Measurement of Profit, Selected Readings in Accounting 342
(Murphy ed. 1952).
108. Dr. T. S. Adams, quoted in May, Accounting and the Accountant in the
Administration of Income Taxation, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 377, 390 (1947).
109. See Postulate 3, American Accounting Ass'n, A Tentative Statement of
Accounting Principles Affecting Corporate Reports, 11 Accounting Rev. 187
(1936).
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mains. "' Construing "method" in a manner similar to its use else-
where in the income tax law as a choice between alternatives,",, the
judiciary and the Commissioner - in general promoted the view that
"method" in the 1918 Act was meant simply to incorporate the cash
and accrual "bases" of the prior legislation. 1 3 The corporate or the
individual taxpayer might compute income on either the cash or the
accrual basis, so long as the method chosen clearly reflected income."
4
This concept became so well established that when the installment
basis was authorized by the Revenue Act of 1926,1" it became firmly
fixed in judicial thinking as the third method of accounting."16
110. "Strange legal, economic, or statistical interpretations made by men, no
doubt eminent in their own fields, but almost entirely innocent of any technical
accounting knowledge . . ." Lasser, Tax Accounting Methods 25 (1951), have
served to multiply conflicts "by treating as questions of law what really are dis-
putes over proper accounting." Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 499 (1943).
111. E.g., the depreciation and retirement methods of accounting for fixed
assets, Boston & M.R.R. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1953); Com-
missioner v. Union Pac. R.R., 188 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951); St. Paul Union Depot
v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1941) ; the reserve and actual charge-off
methods of accounting for bad debts, Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Commissioner,
151 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1945); Rogen v. Commercial Discount Co., 149 F.2d 585
(9th Cir. 1945); see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166; adding taxes to inventory
cost or deducting them as an expense, Le Bolt v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 422
(1929). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1957).
112. Unable to secure the repeal of § 41, the Bureau "sought to build up the
myth that Congress contemplated an alternative between the cash and the accrual
basis." May, Tax Accounting v. Business Accounting, 79 J. Accountancy 323
(1945). "Nothing was further removed from the minds of those who worked on
Sections 212 and 213 of the Revenue Act of 1918 ... " Adams op. cit. supra
note 108.
113. Precisely, the Revenue Act of 1916 provided only that a taxpayer "keeping
accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements,
unless such other basis does not clearly reflect his income, may, subject to regula-
tions made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, make his return upon the basis upon which his accounts
are kept, in which case the tax shall be computed upon his income as so returned."
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8(g), 13(d), 39 Stat. 763, 771. The Board of Tax
Appeals seems to have been of varying opinion as to whether this contemplated
only an alternative between the cash and the accrual bases. See Great No. Ry.,
8 B.T.A. 225, 268 (1927), aff'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855
(1930); Owen-Ames-Kimball Co., 5 B.T.A. 921, 927 (1926).
114. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 498 (1948) ; Beacon
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Elsie SoRelle,
22 T.C. 459, 468 (1954); cf. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 131 (1954).
115. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 23; Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 44, 53 Stat. 24; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453. Basically, the installment
method permits dealers regularly engaged in selling personal property on the in-
stallment basis and other taxpayers selling real property or making casual sales of
personalty to report as income each year only that proportion of the cash actually
received as the gross profit on the transaction bears to the total contract price.
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From time to time various other specialized methods of accounting
have been authorized by the income tax regulations.11 7 Chiefly, they
represent administrative modification of the annual accounting re-
quirement.1 8 Taxpayers engaged in the performance of long-term
contracts 1 9 were early authorized 120 to report the net income arising
from such contracts either in the year of completion"21 or during the
Under the installment method expenses are deducted in the year in which paid
or incurred, without regard to collections.
The installment basis was first authorized by Treas. Reg. 33, art. 120 (1918).
In B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762 (1925), this regulation was held invalid because
the installment method was not one of "the methods" authorized by the statute.
The legislative history of the resulting statutory provision, which applied retro-
actively from 1916, is discussed at length in Hoover-Bond Co. v. Denman, 59
F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1932); Willcuts v. Gradwohl, 58 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1932);
Blum's, Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737 (1927). The installment basis has been judicially
described as a "modified cash receipts basis," since income is in part represented
by cash receipts. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 499
(1948) ; Commissioner v. Mackin, 164 F.2d 527, 529 (1st Cir. 1947); Palm Beach
Mather Co., 24 B.T.A. 536 (1931). More accurately, it is "an admixture of both,
since revenues are measured principally on a cash basis while expired costs and
expenses are measured on the accrual basis." 1 Newlove & Garner, Advanced
Accounting 465 (1951) ; Holmes & Meier, Intermediate Accounting 423-24 (1949);
see note 76 supra.
116. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 281 n.7 (1952); Commissioner v.
South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 502 n.13 (1948); Martin v. Commissioner,
61 F.2d 942, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 737 (1932).
117. Of these it may "hardly appear desirable to write." Ferst, Basic Account-
ing for Lawyers 16 (1950).
118. Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 24 B.T.A. 626, 641 (1931).
119. Building, installation, or construction contracts covering a period in excess
of one year from the date of the execution of the contract to the date on which
the contract is finally completed and accepted. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957). A
maintenance period is a separate and collateral undertaking; it does not operate to
extend the performance time of the contract. Uvalde Co., 1 B.T.A. 932 (1925).
Short-term contracts may, under certain circumstances, be reported on this basis
if it clearly reflects income. See 1959 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 41, at 12.
A novel use of the "completed contract" method was unsuccessfully urged by
the taxpayer in Whitaker v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1958), who
sought to defer breeding fees until the live colt was born, on the grounds that the
contract, guaranteeing delivery of live colt, was not "completed" until that time.
Cf. Wood v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1957), affirming 24 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 969 (1955) (contracts for sale of lots are not "building or construction"
contracts).
120. See Treas. Reg. 33, art. 121 (1918). The validity of the regulations was
sustained in Badgley v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1932); In re Harring-
ton, 1 F.2d 749 (W.D. Mo. 1924); Hegeman-Harris Co. v. United States, 87 Ct.
Cl. 296, 23 F. Supp. 450 (1938).
121. This method is generally termed the "completed-contract" method, but it
has also been called the "closed-job" method. D. L. Wheelock, 10 B.T.A. 540
(1928). The year of completion is, understandably, not always free from doubt.
The Tax Court has held that the requirement of "finally completed" in the regu-
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construction period on the basis of the percentage of completion.122
Maritime venturers may report income upon the accrual system on the
completed voyage basis 2 3 and sometimes upon the completed lay-up
basis.24 Farmers 12 - and other agrarian producers may defer expendi-
lations is redundant, that substantial completion will suffice. Ehret-Day Co.,
2 T.C. 25 (1943); cf. Helvering v. National Contracting Co., 69 F.2d 252 (8th
Cir. 1934).
122. The percentage-of-completion method is sometimes termed the "job cost"
method. Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1946). The percentage of completion may be based upon architects' fees or the
proportion of costs incurred to date to total costs. Ross B. Hammond, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 97 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1938); Vansant v. Crooks, 43 F.2d
166 (W.D. Mo. 1930).
The completed contract method is not an accounting method in the sense that
it accounts for receipts and disbursements on a day-to-day basis. It is a practice
of treating receipts from a contract as income as of a particular time, namely,
the completion date of the contract. Daley v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 376,
378 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832
(1957). It is a modification of the strict accrual method and differs from it in
that items of income and expense, although recorded in primary accounts when
accrued or incurred, are not carried into the profit and loss as earnings of the
business until the contracts to which they relate are completed. Patrick McGovern,
Inc., 40 B.T.A. 706, 713 (1939).
Income from long-term contracts may also be reported on a cost-plus-fixed-fee
basis, a cost-plus-fixed-percentage basis, on the straight accrual basis, or on the
cash basis. Daley v. United States, supra; Dingle-Clark Co., 26 T.C. 782 (1956);
C. A. Hunt Eng'r Co., 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1029 (1956); 1 Moonitz & Staehling,
Accounting Analysis 284-94 (1950). Gilman 115, observed that practically all
accountants argue in favor of allocation of the profits on long-term contracts to
the several periods involved, but few attempt to justify it; many have observed
that it is illogical and that it represents an important exception to the general
convention of realization. See generally Condon & Horn, Tax Accounting for
Long Term Contracts, 30 Taxes 37 (1952); Wagman, Tax Accounting for Long
Term Contracts, 33 Taxes 277 (1955); Committee on Accounting Procedure,
Accounting Research Bull. No. 45, Long-Term Construction Type Contracts
(Oct. 1955).
123. Planet Line, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1937); Falketind
Ship Co., 6 B.T.A. 44 (1927).
124. Seas Shipping Co., 1 T.C. 30 (1942). For the completed-voyage basis, at
least, there is more than ample historical accounting background. Kahuku Planta-
tion Co., 12 B.T.A. 977, 984 (1928) ; see Peragallo, Double Entry Bookkeeping 34
(1938).
125. Perhaps the natural objects of legislative bounty, farmers and livestock
raisers have a broad choice of accounting methods, including the cash receipts
method, the crop method, the ordinary accrual method, and various modifications
of the accrual method, including the farm-price method of inventory valuation.
Kenneth S. Battelle, 9 T.C. 299, 304 (1947). Hatchery operators and breeders
of chinchillas, minks, and foxes may be farmers for purposes of this regulation.
United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1957); Rev. Rul. 57-588, 1957-2
Cum. Bull. 305; cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 175. Certainly, these bucolic busi-
nessmen have been the object of bountiful literary endeavors concerning their tax
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tures upon each crop until the year in which the crop is sold, and thus
report income on the crop basis.12 3 The completed transaction basis 12
and the earnings basis128 may also fulfill the fundamental require-
ment of clearly reflecting income. The Commissioner, if not the tax-
payer, may choose among several constructive methods of accounting
in ascertaining taxable income.129 The cash method, the accrual
method, the installment method, and the long-term contract method
remain, however, the principal methods of accounting. 30
Whatever the proper nomenclature, 1 1' the function of the basis or
method of accounting seems clear in both accounting and the federal
income tax law. It is solely one of timing, of determining when in-
come is to be regarded as earned and when expenditures are to be
deemed incurred. 32 A method of accounting is the procedure em-
ployed to determine the income of a particular period. 3 3 It does not
determine whether there is income'3 4 nor the person to whom the
income is attributable,' 35 but only when, to which accounting period
quandaries. See, e.g., Beebe, The Farmer-Control of Income and Expense, 24 Miss.
L.J. 208 1953); Halstead, Taxation of Farmers: Accounting Methods, Records,
and Returns, 1 Prac. Law. 57 (1955); Throcknorton, Federal Taxation of the
Farmer, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 251 (1949); Comment, Farmers and the Federal In-
come Tax, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 522 (1952).
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(c) (1957). The crop basis has been most popular,
judicially at least, among Hawaiian sugar producers. Kahuku Plantation Co. v.
Commissioner, 132 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1943). See Kekaha Sugar Co. v. Burnet,
50 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Oahu Sugar Co., 13 B.T.A. 405 (1928); Kahuku
Plantation Co., 12 B.T.A. 977 (1928). But see Amling-De Vor Nurseries, Inc.,
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (rose bushes); A. D. McNeill,
10 B.T.A. 1285 (1928) (naval stores).
127. Gilbert W. Lee, 6 B.T.A. 135 (1927), appeal dismissed, 41 F.2d 1004
(6th Cir. 1930). But cf. Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281,
287 (1944).
128. See Reiling, Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Accounting, 30 Taxes 1028,
1029-31 (1952).
129. See infra note 174.
130. Lasser, Tax Accounting Methods 3 (1951) ; cf. H. J. Irby, Jr., 30 T.C. 1166,
1174 (1958).
131. As a matter of accounting precedence "basis" would appear to describe
better the process in question. "Method" is the terminology of the federal income
tax statute. Generally, this distinction is subsequently preserved herein although
the value thereof may sometimes be in doubt.
132. Commissioner v. Mnookin, 184 F.2d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1950); Holmes, Ad-
vanced Accounting 198 (1947); cf. Huntington Sec. Corp. v. Busey, 112 F.2d
368, 370 (6th Cir. 1940).
133. 1 Newlove & Garner, Advanced Accounting 403 (1951).
134. Ahern, Getting the Best Effective Use Out of Accounting Methods and
Accounting Periods, N.Y.U. 6th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 479 (1947).
135. Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
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income and expenses are to be assigned.136 For federal income tax
purposes a method of accounting does not enlarge the scope of the
statutory deductions,",7 transform ordinary income into capital gain,138
or make that income which is not.1 9
Because the sole function is one of timing, any method of account-
ing will, over the long run, if consistently followed, yield substantially
proper results. 14 The Commissioner has evinced, however, a notable
reluctance to await the eventual compensating factors of any method.
Instead he has chosen to levy upon income as rapidly and to delay
deductions as long as the statute and the courts will permit. Methods
of accounting, lacking as they are in "glittering perfection,"1 4 have
borne the brunt of this sometimes overly zealous protection of the
revenues.
Selection and Choice
The law has given choice of accounting method largely to the tax-
payer. The consequences of his selection and the ensuing difficulty of
change make it apparent, however, that his espousal should not be
undertaken in haste.
The regulations long have recognized that no uniform method of
accounting can be prescribed for all taxpayers.1 42 Rather, the law
contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems
of accounting as are, in his judgment, best suited to his purposes.14 3
He may adopt separate methods for each of his business enterprises,
as well as for his personal income. 4 4 Initial selection4 5 is thus lodged
136. Lasser, Tax Accounting Methods 2 (1951); see Clarence Shock, I B.T.A.
518, 530 (1925). A method of accounting does not refer to the treatment accorded
on the books to an isolated transaction. Stern Bros., 13 B.T.A. 1192, 1193 (1928).
137. Surety-Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1935); J. I. Case
Co. v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 257, 65 F. Supp. 464 (1946).
138. Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1014 (1954).
139. Barker v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 468, 26 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (1939).
140. Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, A Tax Program for a Solvent America
90; see Bent v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1932); Great No. Ry.,
8 B.T.A. 225, 268 (1927).
141. Judge Opper, dissenting in Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 17 T.C. 1097, 1110
(1952).
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a) (2) (1957); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-3 (1953);
Treas. Reg. 45, art. 24 (1919).
143. Ibid. This phraseology contemplates that a liberal latitude be allowed to
the taxpayer in keeping his books, but it does not waive the requirement that any
system adopted must truly reflect income. G. E. Cotton, 25 B.T.A. 866, 869 (1932).
144. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(d); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
200 (1954). See Commissioner v. Standing, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1958); Harvey
v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 1949); Bird Ranch & Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 152 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 863 (1946) ; Cecil v.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
exclusively in the taxpayer,146 and the law contemplates considerable
discretion on his part in that respect.
147
His hand is not altogether untrammeled. The method selected may
not leave control over the items of income and deductions within the
taxpayer's own judgment.148 If he keeps no books of account, income
must be reported on the cash basis. 49 The primary limitation is that
set forth in the statute: any method of accounting employed must
clearly reflect income.'5 0 This requirement has been construed to mean
that the method must reflect income with as much accuracy as stand-
ard methods of accounting practice permit.' 15 If inventories are an
income-determining factor, the accrual method may be the only one
Commissioner, 100 F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1939); David Hanover, 12 T.C. 342 (1949);
Berryman D. Fincannon, 2 T.C. 216 (1943) ; Joseph Stern, 14 B.T.A. 838 (1928) ;
cf. M. G. Corlett, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 95 (1946); I. Townsend Burden, 12 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 246 (1943). The system used as to each separate business must be
consistent within itself, however. Bennett Properties Co., 45 B.T.A. 696 (1941).
Quaere: what constitutes a separate business? See Wetherbee Elec. Co. v.
Jones, 73 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. Okla. 1947); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 355.
145. The Commissioner has been sometimes chary of the status of a "new"
taxpayer. See Berryman D. Fincannon, 2 T.C. 216 (1943); 3 CCH 1960 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. 2822.492; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 381(c) (4). But see Morris
Poston Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 46 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1930); Akron, C. & Y.
R.R., 22 T.C. 648 (1954); Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954).
146. Huntington Sec. Corp. v. Busey, 112 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1940). But cf.
Harvey v. Comnmissioner, 171 F.2d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 1949).
147. Hiram W. Evans, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 312 (1946).
148. Such a method is without the pale of the sound basis of accounting re-
quired by the Internal Revenue Code. V. T. H. Bien, 20 T.C. 49 (1953).
149. In re Newman, 94 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1938); Greengard v. Commissioner,
29 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1928); Bellevue Mfg. Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 331 (1957);
Dan Birkemeier, 39 B.T.A. 1072 (1939); Oscar G. Joseph, 32 B.T.A. 1192, 1204
(1935); Wilson Marks, 6 B.T.A. 729 (1927); U.S. Treas. Dep't, Your 1959 Federal
Income Tax Forms 7 (1959).
150. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(b); Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn,
282 U.S. 92 (1930); Jud Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681
(5th Cir. 1946). The income clearly reflected may be in part illegal. Barker v.
United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 468, 26 F. Supp. 1004 (1939).
151. Caldwell v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1953). The view ex-
pressed in Osterloh v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1930), and subsequently cited
with approval in Welch v. DeBlois, 94 F.2d 842, 844 (1938), Huntington Sec.
Corp. v. Busey, 112 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1940), and Kentucky Color & Chem. Co. v.
Glenn, 186 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1951), that "clearly" means only "plainly, honestly,
straightforwardly and frankly," but not necessarily "accurately" has been rejected
by its progenitor. Boynton v. Pedrick, 136 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd
per curiam, 228 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1955).
The clear reflection of "net earnings" is seemingly something entirely differ-
ent. South Dade Farms v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943).
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which will meet this requirement2. 2 Even approved standard methods
of accounting may not clearly reflect income in every instance.- 3
Prior to the 1954 Code, at least,5- it was clear that the taxpayer
was required to follow consistently the method adopted. Hybrid
methods of accounting were not ordinarily regarded as clearly re-
flecting income.> :" Thus income could not be reported upon an accrual
basis and deductions upon a cash basis ;156 nor could various items of
152. Herberger v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
820 (1952); A. & A. Tool & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.
1950); E. S. Iley, 19 T.C. 631 (1952); Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958); A.R.R. 217,
3 Cum. Bull. 76 (1920); cf. Simon v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1949);
see Kohler & Morrison, Principles of Accounting 166-67 (1926). But see Goodrich
v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1957); Glenn v. Kentucky Color & Chem.
Co,, 186 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1951); Russell v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.
1930) ; Stanford R. Brookshire, 31 T.C. No. 119 (Mar. 18, 1959).
153. Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1944).
Methods of accounting which clearly reflect the income of a going concern may
not clearly reflect the income of the entity when it is in the process of liquidation,
particularly if the liquidation would, under the method of accounting employed,
prevent the taxpayer's realizing income at any time. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 934 (1952); Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Jud Plumbing & Heating v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Susan J. Carter, 9 T.C. 364 (1947); cf. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, §§ 337, 482; Rev. Rul. 59-120, 1959 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 15, at 13. The
problem in some instances may not be so much one of method of accounting as
method of allocation of income to the proper taxpayer. Alden Charles Palmer,
29 T.C. 154 (1957), aff'd, 267 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 821
(1959); cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 482.
154. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(c) (4). And even under the 1954 Code, a
hybrid method apparently may not be used unless it clearly reflects income. See
Alta Co-op. Elevator, P-H 1959 Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 11 59,033. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (iv) (1957) ; Jones, Hybrid Accounting Is Bad Taxvise, 92
J. Accountancy 206 (1951).
155. Hygienic Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 665 (1940); Harry Hartley, 23 T.C. 353 (1954); Frank Imburgia, 22
T.C. 1002 (1954) ; Stern Bros. & Co., 16 T.C. 295 (1951); Comstock-Castle Stove
Co., 4 B.T.A. 114 (1926); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2 (1953). But cf. Bernard
B. Carter, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 237 (1957), modified on other grounds, 257 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1958). Not even the Commissioner, in the exercise of his discretion,
can compel a taxpayer to remain on a hybrid basis. Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459
(1954). The Commissioner may make adjustments necessary to conform to the
predominant method. Julius I. Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234, 1246 (1951); Maine Dairy
Co., 4 B.T.A. 375 (1926).
156. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948);
Hygienic Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 330, 331 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Eckert v.
Commissioner, 42 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 283 U.S. 140 (1930); Julius I.
Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234, 1246 (1951) ; Henry Reubel, 1 B.T.A. 676 (1925).
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income and deductions be accounted for under different methods.157
When the law speaks of "the method of accounting," it brooks no
merely haphazard division between the cash and the accrual bases.'r
The taxpayer cannot be permitted any variations from the basis se-
lected."59 Consistency is the key; it is required regardless of the
method used.1 60
Having selected a proper method of accounting for keeping his
books,' "6 the taxpayer is required to report his taxable income in ac-
157. Income: Merchants Nat'l Bank, 6 B.T.A. 1167 (1927); Continental Life
Ins. Co., 5 B.T.A. 407 (1926); cf. Automobile Club of N.Y., 32 T.C. No. 79 (July
20, 1959) (dissenting opinion). Deductions: Waldheim Realty & Inv. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957); Herndon v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 55
(5th Cir. 1949); J. H. Martinus & Sons v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.
1940); National Straw Works, 16 B.T.A. 463 (1929), aff'd, 47 F.2d 844 (7th Cir.
1931); Bruno 0. A. dePaoli, 8 B.T.A. 294, 296 (1927) (dicta). But see New
Capital Hotel, Inc., 28 T.C. 706 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir.
1958). The consistency required is with respect to the treatment by each taxpayer
of all his transactions. Jenkins v. Bitgood, 22 F. Supp. 16, 17 (D. Conn. 1938),
aff'd, 101 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 636 (1939).
158. Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 587 (1935).
159. W. L. Moody Cotton Co. v. Commrissioner, 143 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1944).
Not even "in the interest of that elasticity necessary if the income tax under
the revenue acts is to be adjusted to the idiosyncrasies of individual business?"
B. B. Todd, 1 B.T.A. 762, 767 (1925). May the Commissioner? Geometric Stamp-
ing Co., 26 T.C. 301, 304 (1956).
160. Advertisers Exch., 25 T.C. 1086, 1092, aff'd per curiam, 240 F.2d 958
(2d Cir. 1957); see Jones v. Smith, 193 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 952 (1952). Does the law impose a greater duty of good faith? Require
that the taxpayer's actions shall be consistent with his books of account? See
Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d 373, 378 (8th Cir. 1943);
Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 577 (1938) ; Acacia Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Commissioner, 67 F.2d 700,
703 (7th Cir. 1934). Mere consistency may sometimes lose its virtue if it fails
clearly to reflect income. Wood v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir.
1952); V. T. H. Bien, 20 T.C. 49 (1953). But cf. International Cigar Mach. Co.,
36 B.T.A. 124 (1937).
The income tax law itself may sometimes offer alternatives. The World War II
excess profits tax law, 56 Stat. 917 (1942), 26 U.S.C. §§ 736(a), (b) (1952),
gave taxpayers reporting under the installment or completed contract method of
accounting for income tax purposes, an option to report income on an accrual basis
for excess profits tax purposes. See Carroll Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 197
F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Leo Kahn Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 404
(6th Cir. 1952); Basalt Rock Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 281 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 966 (1950); Kimbrell's Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Commissioner,
159 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1947); Aetna-Standard Eng'r Co., 15 T.C. 284 (1950).
161. Or perhaps, as in the case of a partnership, having had it selected for him.
See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 703 (b) ; Percival H. Truman, 3 B.T.A. 386 (1926);
cf. National Builders, Inc., 12 T.C. 852 (1949).
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cordance with such method. 16- If he desires to change his method of
accounting, he must comply with the statutory requirements. 163 If he
files returns upon a basis other than that used in keeping his accounts,
or changes his method of reporting income without permission, the
Commissioner's acceptance of prior returns does not give rise to an
estoppel." The taxpayer may not, after the time for filing the origi-
nal return has expired, change the method selected by filing an
amended return.-
162. Huntington Sec. Corp. v. Busey, 112 F.2d 368, 370 (6th Cir. 1940);
Kabatznick v. Eaton, 45 F.2d 244 (D. Conn. 1930); Shaw v. United States, 49
F.2d 628 (N.D. Ill. 1930); American Conservation Serv. Corp., 24 B.T.A. 183
(1931); Ribbon Cliff Fruit Co., 12 B.T.A. 13 (1928); J. L. Allhands, 10 B.T.A.
1089 (1928). If the taxpayer keeps his formal accounts on the accrual basis and
converts them to a cash basis by means of entries on the accountant's work papers
prior to preparation of the tax return, are his "books" kept on the cash or accrual
basis? Patchen v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1958), reversing 27 T.C.
,)92 (1956) ; cf. Geometric Stamping Co., 26 T.C. 301 (1956).
When the installment method or long-term contract method is used for reporting
income, it is only necessary that the books be kept in such fashion that "adequate
information" is available from which income on an installment or a long-term
contract method can be computed. Daley v. United States, 243 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 (1957); Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co., 18 T.C. 39
(1952); R. G. Bent Co., 26 B.T.A. 1369 (1932); Herman Tillman, 10 B.T.A. 4
(1928) ; Redlick-Newman Co., 8 B.T.A. 719 (1927). Contra, Bent v. Commissioner,
56 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1932).
163. See Change of Accounting Method, infra p. 30.
164. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 356, 362 (1930); Wood
v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1957); Carver v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d
29 (6th Cir. 1949), affirming per curiam 10 T.C. 171 (1948); Ross B. Hammond,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1938); Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 75 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Charles
D. Mifflin, 24 T.C. 973 (1955); Harry Hartley, 23 T.C. 353 (1954). But see
Maloney v. Hammond, 176 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Alexander H. Kerr & Co.
v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
165. Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194 (1938); Daley v. United
States, 243 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 (1957) ; Franklin County
Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1942); Elmwood Corp. v.
United States, 107 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940);
Kay-Jones Furniture Co., 24 P-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 790 (1955); Hegeman-Harris Co.
v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 296, 23 F. Supp. 450 (1938) ; I.T. 1190, 1-1 Cum. Bull.
49 (1922). But see Key Largo Shore Properties, Inc., 21 B.T.A. 1008 (1930).
Acceptance of a method applied by the Commissioner in determining a deficiency
is equally binding. Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1938). The taxpayer must originally have had some choice, however,
James D. Boone, 27 B.T.A. 1064 (1933).
The rule is not based upon estoppel, but upon the fact that the contrary view
would allow the taxpayer to escape taxation on income attributed to closed years,
thus rendering impossible the taxation of income on an annual basis. Southern
Abstract & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1095 (1932), aff'd, 72 F.2d 130
(6th Cir. 1936). It applies to treatment of a particular item as well as a general
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If the method of accounting employed by the taxpayer does not
clearly reflect the income,' 66 or if no method of accounting has been
employed,167 taxable income is to be computed in accordance with such
method as, in the opinion of the Commissioner, does clearly reflect
income.16 18 Much discretionary latitude is here given to the Com-
missioner,169 and the burden is upon the taxpayer to prove that com-
putation in accordance with a method of accounting different from
the one employed by the Commissioner will more clearly reflect in-
come.1 70 Thus, the Commissioner may determine income' 7 ' upon the
cash or the accrual basis ;172 adjust particular items ;173 or reconstruct
method of accounting. See, e.g., Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States,
152 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 806 (1946); Grand Central
Pub. Mkt., Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed,
98 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1938) (deposits); Bobrow Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner,
135 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1943); Le Bolt & Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 422 (1929)
(import duties); S. Nicholas Jacobs, 21 T.C. 165 (1953) (installment basis);
Walter L. Ross, 30 B.T.A. 496 (1934), aff'd, 83 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1936) (election
to report income from employment contract as received); J. E. Mergott Co. v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1949) (container inventories).
166. Whether or not the method of accounting employed by the taxpayer clearly
reflects income is a question of fact. Boynton v. Pedrick, 136 F. Supp. 888, 889
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 228 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1955).
167. The Tax Court has, upon occasion, questioned whether a taxpayer keeping
records could be considered to have any accounting method. See Arthur B. Bell-
wood, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1951); John A. Brander, 3 B.T.A. 231 (1925).
The congressional reports on Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446, make it clear, however,
that it is not necessary to keep books in order to have an accounting method. In
the case of a taxpayer whose sole source of income is wages, duplicate tax returns
or other records may be sufficient to constitute the use of the method of accounting
used in the preparation of income tax returns. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. a158 (1954).
168. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446 (b); In re Newman, 94 F.2d 108 (6th Cir.
1938).
169. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930); Wood v. Commis-
sioner, 197 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1952); Harvey v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 952, 955
(9th Cir. 1949).
170. Welp v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Iowa 1952), and cases
there cited; Arthur B. Bellwood, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1951).
171. The Commissioner has no statutory authority to order a change in the
method of accounting; he merely computes income as if a change to the proper
method had been made. Welp v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 551, 560 (N.D. Iowa
1952).
172. Even though the taxpayer kept no books. A. & A. Tool & Supply Co. v.
Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1950); Schram v. United States, 118 F.2d
541 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 695 (1941); United States v. McKenna, 126
F. Supp. 831 (D.C. Minn. 1954); Bond-Gleason, Inc., P-H 1959 Tax Ct. Rep. &
Mem. Dec. f 59,002; Ella Pipes Cline, 15 B.T.A. 934 (1929). May the Commis-
sioner determine income under a long-term contract method or the installment
method if such method would more clearly reflect the income? Cf. Int. Rev. Code
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income in accordance with any one or more of several "constructive
methods" of accounting, 17 4 in order clearly to reflect income. 7 5 His
of 1954, § 453 (a) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957) ; Dawley v. United States, 186
F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1951); Dan Birkemeier, 39 B.T.A. 1072 (1938); J. R. Vansant,
4 B.T.A. 58 (1926) (semble).
173. Gatliff v. Helburn, 31 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1940); First Nat'l Benefit
Soc'y, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 191 (9th Cir.
1950) ; Susan J. Carter, 9 T.C. 364 (1947) ; Theodore Stanfield, 8 B.T.A. 787, 823
(1927); cf. Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957);
United States v. American Can Co., 280 U.S. 412 (1930).
174. A taxpayer who keeps no records, or inadequate records, or records which
do not accurately reflect "true income," may be subjected to a determination of
his income by the Commissioner via any, or any combination of the following
methods:
(1) The net worth method, in which the taxpayer's net worth at the be-
ginning and at the end of the taxable period are determined, and the increase,
adjusted for living expenses, is deemed to be taxable income. See Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142
(1954); Daniel Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States
v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954). The net worth method was once deemed
to be a necessary concomitant of the single entry system of bookeeping.
See Index Notion Co., 3 B.T.A. 90 (1925).
(2) The bank deposit method, which assumes that the taxpayer's bank
deposits, unless otherwise identified, constitute taxable income. See Doll v.
Glenn, 231 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1956); Boyett v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 205
(5th Cir. 1953); Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950); Harris v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.
1949) ; Frank J. Moore, 37 B.T.A. 378, 387 n.1 (1938).
(3) The percentage method, which assumes that the taxpayer's net profit
should be the same as that of other taxpayers in similar lines of endeavor.
See Casper v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1955); Gamin v. Com-
missioner, 39 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1930); Glenn Stewart, 24 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem.
297 (1955); cf. United States v. Mayer, 26 Fed. Cas. 1225 (No. 15,753)
(D. Ore. 1865).
(4) The excess cash expenditures method, which compares the taxpayer's
expenditures during the taxable year with his reported income, and increases
the latter by any excess of the former. See Marcella v. Commissioner, 222
F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1955); Dupree v. United States, 218 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1955) ; Max Cohen, 9 T.C. 1156, 1163 (1947).
Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281, 285 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
993 (1953); Hyman B. Stone, 22 T.C. 893 (1954). In recent years the Commis-
sioner appears to have added a fifth, the "raw materials consumption method."
See D & H Bagel Bakery, Inc., 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 279 (1955) ; Neptune Bagel
Bakers, Inc., id. at 283.
The ingenuity of the Commissioner in this field is equaled only by that of the
taxpayer. Compare Commissioner v. Gasper, 225 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1955) (liquor
receipts should be computed by multiplying the number of bottles in each selling
price group by 22 drinks per bottle) and Albert E. MacCrowe, 24 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 799 (1955), remanded (most recently), 264 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1959) (the
number of morphine tablets purchased times the fee per operation equals the
taxpayer's income from abortion patients) with Boyett v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d
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"clear-reflection-of-income" powers are subject to some limitation.
The Commissioner's rejection of a return made in accordance with
the method of accounting regularly employed by the taxpayer is sub-
ject to judicial review.176 Departure is justified only where there
would otherwise be a material distortion of income.177 The power does
not enable the Commissioner to add to income an item which properly
belongs to an earlier year and thus nullify the statute of limitations. 178
Change of Accounting Method
Change of accounting method the law has largely placed within the
province of the Commissioner. He has sometimes been circumvented
in his protection of the fisc, however, by some lamentable niceties of
legal nuances.
205 (5th Cir. 1953) (the taxpayer's bank deposits consisted of currency which he
had formerly secreted in an old thermos jug) and Doris Loisell Mullen, 19 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 377 (1950) (her increases in assets were due to gifts from her para-
mour; her small profits from her restaurant business to the facts that she was
away such an unusual amount of time and the OPA price on her blue plate was
so low she could not make any money).
The use of constructive methods of accounting is not limited to situations where
the taxpayer keeps no books or where his books are inadequate. Congress never
intended "to make § 41 a set of blinders which prevents the Government from
looking beyond the self-serving declaration in a taxpayer's books." Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 131 (1954); see Thomas v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d
83 (6th Cir. 1955); Abraham Galant, 26 T.C. 354 (1956); cf. Jacobs v. United
States, 126 F. Supp. 154 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Bechelli v. Hofferbert, 111 F. Supp. 631
(D. Md. 1953). Contra, United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Va.
1954); Ragsdale v. Paschal, 118 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
Strictly speaking, these constructive methods are not "methods of accounting"
at all. They are not substitutes for the cash or accrual method or any other recog-
nized method of keeping books, but merely evidences of income. Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 131 (1954); United States v. Ridley, 120 F. Supp. 530, 535
(N.D. Ga. 1954); Eugene Vassallo, 23 T.C. 656, 661-62 (1955); Morris Lipsitz,
21 T.C. 917, 931 (1954). See also Kohler & Morrison, Principles of Accounting
277-79 (1926); Note, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 563 (1950), both of which make some
critical statements of the so-called constructive methods. The former deems every
assumption in the process "an absurdity"; the latter suggests that "judicial guess"
should be added to the list of methods.
175. If the taxpayer's method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, and
the method proposed by the Commissioner likewise fails, the courts will not select
one which does. The statute contemplates action by the Commissioner, not by the
courts. Hardin v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1955).
176. Russell v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1930); Oesterlein Mach.
Co., 1 B.T.A. 159 (1924).
177. National Builders, Inc., 12 T.C. 852 (1949).
178. Commissioner v. Schuyler, 196 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1952); Commissioner v.
Mnookin, 184 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950); Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137
F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943); Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 28 T.C. 412 (1957).
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Section 446 (e) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code 79 requires a
taxpayer who is changing his method of accounting 80 to secure the
permission of the Commissioner before computing his taxable income
under the new method., s The purpose of the requirement is to pro-
mote consistent adherence by the taxpayer to the same accounting
practice from year to year, thereby securing uniformity of collec-
tion.' "- If the taxpayer were permitted to change at random, con-
fusion would result183
Some confusion prevails, nonetheless, regarding what constitutes a
change in the method of accounting. The 1954 Code Regulations
define such a change to include a change in the over-all method of
accounting for gross income or deductions, or a change in the treat-
ment of a material item; examples cited are a change from the cash
method to an accrual method, or vice versa, a change in the method
of inventory valuation, or a change from the cash or accrual method
to the long-term contract method." 4 The courts from time to time
have set forth their views. A change from the retirement method of
accounting to the depreciation method falls within the ambit of the
requirement.' - A change in billing from a shipment basis to a
monthly contract basis has been held to constitute a change of method
requiring permission,s, as has the establishment of a reserve de-
179. And, prior thereto, the regulations. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2 (c)
(1953).
180. "On the basis of which he regularly computes his income in keeping his
books . . . ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(e). Whatever other improvements
were wrought by the 1954 Code, it did nothing for the grammatical construction
of § 41.
181. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 442.
182. Shoong Inv. Co. v. Anglim, 45 F. Supp. 711 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
183. Maurice W. Simon, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1947), aff'd, 176 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1949).
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e) (1957). The 1939 Code regulations [Reg. 118,
§ 39.41-2 (c) ] did not differ materially. The new regulations embody in part the
language of the Committee reports, which added to the existing definiton "a change
in the treatment of a material item, such as a change in the method of depreciating
any property." The Commissioner did not include, however, the Committee lan-
guage distinguishing "a substantial change (in the method of accounting) from
each change in the treatment of each item." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. a158 (1954) ; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 300 (1954). Property
taxes and vacation pay are "material items" for this purpose. Rev. Rul. 59-285,
1959 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 36, at 32.
185. St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1941);
Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 692 (1941); Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 44 B.T.A. 905 (1951). See
Jones v. Smith, 193 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 952 (1952).
186. Advertisers Exch., Inc., 25 T.C. 1086 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 240 F.2d
958 (2d Cir. 1957).
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ferring a part of the sales price.18 7 Correction of individual items is
not a change in the method of accounting,88 nor is a method adopted
to reflect a new mode of operation. 18 9
In some instances the necessity for the consent of the Commissioner
has been dispensed with by the statute, the regulations or the courts.
Permission is not required, for example, to change from the accrual
basis to the installment basis. 9 t Under the 1939 Code Regulations,
farmers were not required to obtain formal permission to change
from the cash method to the farm-price inventory method, if there
was no change in the method of inventory valuation.' 0 1 The bride may
adopt the method of the groom. 92 If the method previously employed
does not clearly reflect income, it may be possible to change to the
correct method without permission.' 9 3 Acceptance of returns on the
new basis in some instances may estop the Commissioner from con-
tending that the necessary consent has not been obtained. 0 4 In
general, however, the regulations are mandatory and must be fol-
lowed. 195 The Commissioner is vested with a wide discretion in grant-
ing or refusing permission to change. 9
187. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp., 26 T.C. 1 (1956); cf. Erica Giepen, 26 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 17 (1957).
188. Cedar Rapids Eng'r Co. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Iowa
1949); Wetherbee Elec. Co. v. Jones, 73 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. Okla.), appeal dis-
missed, 164 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1947) ; cf. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,
218 F.2d 697, 702 (10th Cir. 1955).
189. Alexander H. Kerr & Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal.
1951). Resumption of a method of depreciation following a period during which
no depreciation was claimed is not a change in accounting method. Guantanamo &
W.R.R., 31 T.C. 842 (1959).
190. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453 (c).
191. Kenneth S. Battelle, 9 T.C. 299 (1947); Angel Milani, 16 P-H Tax Ct.
Iem. 945 (1947); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(c)-6 (1953); O.D. 841, 4 Cum. Bull.
53 (1921). Contra, I.T. 2614. XI-1 Cum. Bull. 48 (1932); Treas. Reg. §
1.471-6 (1958). The farmer must comply with the requirements of the regulations
relating to adjustment sheets and the payment of additional tax due for prior
years, if any. A. J. McDaniel, 19 T.C. 474 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 210 F.2d 540
(6th Cir. 1954).
192. Cf. Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954).
193. William Hardy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1936); Reyn-
olds Cattle Co., 31 B.T.A. 906 (1934); Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 1 B.T.A.
460 (1925) ; cf. Gus Blass Co., 9 T.C. 15 (1947) ; Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com-
missioner, 218 F.2d 697, 702 (10th Cir. 1955) (dictum). The question is posed but
not answered in Simon v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1949).
194. Fowler Bros. & Cox, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 774 (6th Cir. 1943);
Tampa Tribune Publishing Co. v. Tomlinson, 52 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1799 (S.D. Fla.
1957). See supra note 164.
195. Ross B. Hammond, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1938);
Jerome R. George, 27 B.T.A. 765 (1933).
196. Shoong Inv. Co. v. Anglim, 45 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1942); cf. Brown v.
Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). For several years the Commissioner has been
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The gradual recognition of the inherent superiority of the accrual
method over the cash method,1 7 coupled with the Commissioner's
growing insistence that only the accrual method would, in certain
instances, clearly reflect income, 198 produced a flood of changes from
the cash to the accrual method."' Unlike the change from the accrual
to the installment method, which early was defined in relatively or-
derly fashion,;',, the cash-accrual change problem took a queasy little
quirk which has produced far more case law than it probably merited.
The difficulty arises because of the "gap or hiatus" between the
two methods in the year of change.20 1 If the taxpayer is allowed to
use opening inventories and accounts receivable 2 2 in computing the
first year's income on an accrual basis, the net amount of these assets
exercising this discretion by simply failing to pass upon applications for change
of accounting method. His nonaction may be due in part to the problems attendant
to the statutory relief of § 481 of the 1954 Code. See infra note 218.
197. See infra, p. 49, Accrual Bases of Accounting.
198. See supra note 152.
199. Changes from an accrual basis to a cash basis involve similar difficulties.
Accounts receivable previously included in income on the accrual basis would
again be taxed as income in the year of receipt. Inventories which had increased
the income of the prior year would be sold without any offsetting cost deduction.
The Commissioner, understandably, has been less concerned with the inequities
arising under this variation, however. See Chemung Canal Trust Co., 30 B.T.A.
230 (1934), aff'd per curiam, 74 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 751
(1935); Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 1 B.T.A. 460 (1925).
200. The regulations, under the regulations version of the installment method,
supra note 115, provided that if the taxpayer changed from an accrual basis to
the installment basis, all profit reduced to cash during the year of change was
required to be included in income even though it had previously been reported as
income on the accrual basis. See Mayer & Co., 9 B.T.A. 815 (1927); Warren
Reilly, 7 B.T.A. 1327 (1927). Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 44(c), 45 Stat. 805,
contained a similar provision. Sec. 705 of the Act (45 Stat. 881) provided, how-
ever, that as to original returns made prior to Feb. 26, 1926, for the taxable year
1924 or prior, if the taxpayer changed to the installment basis: (1) no refund
would be granted unless the taxpayer had overpaid his tax, computed by in-
cluding in income amounts received during the year of change on account of the
sales of previous years; and (2) no deficiency would be determined unless the
taxpayer had underpaid his tax, computed by excluding from income the amounts
received during the year of change on account of sales of the previous year. See
Wanamaker v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
738 (1933); Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 12 B.T.A. 1024, 1043 (1928), aff'd
sub nom. Grand Rapids Store Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 915 (6th
Cir. 1932).
201. Bank of Hartsville, 1 B.T.A. 920, 921 (1925).
202. As a matter of sheer consistency, the taxpayer customarily also takes into
account the opening accounts payable. It would be to his advantage to be able to
ignore them since amounts charged to opening accounts payable would otherwise
appear as expense of the taxable year.
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in effect escapes taxation.20 3 The early decisions clearly sustained the
right and indeed the duty204 of the Commissioner to exact as the price
of permission to change the requirement that the opening inventories
203. On a "pure" cash basis the opening inventories would have been deducted
as an expense of the preceding years when acquired. Permitting the taxpayer to
use the opening inventories to compute the first year's income on an accrual basis
permits him to deduct the cost of these inventories a second time, opening in-
ventories serving to increase the cost of goods sold. Similarly, the taxpayer would
not have taken into the income of the preceding year the ending accounts receiv-
able since they were not collected in that year. If he is entitled to use the opening
balances in the first year's income on an accrual basis, the amounts will escape
taxation entirely, the collections being credited to the asset account rather than
to income in that year. The problem perhaps may be illustrated by the following
example in which Column (a) sets forth the customary contention of the taxpayer
and Column (b) that of the Commissioner as to the proper method of computing
the income of the first taxable year on the accrual basis:
Sales: (a) (b)
Receivables at end of year $20,000 $20,000
Cash collections during year
(1) on this year's sales 18,000 18,000
(2) on last year's sales - 7,000*
Net Sales $38,000 $45,000
Cost of Goods Sold:
Inventory beginning of year $ 5,000 $ -
Goods purchased during year 19,000 19,000
$24,000 $19,000
Inventory end of year 3,000 3,000
Cost of goods sold $21,000 $16,000
Gross Profit on Sales $17,000 $29,000
Expenses:
Accounts payable year-end $ 5,000 $ 5,000
Paid during the year in cash
(1) this year's expenses 2,000 2,000
(2) last year's expenses - 4,000**
Net expenses $ 7,000 $11,000
Net income $10,000 $18,000
* Assumed, for purposes of simplicity, to be the opening balance of accounts
receivable.
** Similarly, the opening balance of accounts payable.
204. Kahuku Plantation Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir.
1942); Maurice W. Simon, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1947), aft'd, 176 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1949).
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and receivables be "pyramided" into the year of change.205 He was
not required to adhere strictly to a "stereotyped accrual form of ac-
counting,"' -' but could take whatever action was necessary to protect
the Government in the collection of its revenues.20 7
The complication arose in those cases in which the taxpayer was
not applying for permission to change to the accrual method, and in
fact was resisting it, but the Commissioner was imposing the change
pursuant to his clear-reflection policing power. The decision in Com-
inissioner o. Mnookn20 - severely limited the pyramiding ability of the
Commissioner, at least in cases in which the taxpayer's change of
method was not self-imposed.-2 9 Mr. Mnookin, a partner in a retail
jewelry business, kept his books on an accrual basis, reflecting both
inventories and receivables. In reporting his income for federal in-
come tax purposes, however, he used inventories, but reported only
the cash collections on sales. In determining his 1942 income on an
accrual basis, the Commissioner sought to add the opening receivables
to income on the grounds that they would otherwise escape taxation.
The Eighth Circuit refused to permit him to do so, distinguishing
William Hardy, Inc.210 on the grounds that Mnookin's books clearly
reflected his income. The change was only in the method of reporting
income, not in the method of keeping his accounts. In fact the Com-
missioner was seeking to add to the taxpayer's income for the current
year an amount properly belonging to an earlier year. The Commis-
sioner's discretion under section 446 did not enable him to nullify the
statute of limitations.2"
205. The alleged result of column (b), note 203 supra. See Dixon, Pyramiding
Income in Changing from a Cash to an Accrual Method of Accounting, 8 Tax
L. Rev. 355 (1953).
206. William Hardy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 1936).
207. Ibid. See Z. W. Koby, 14 T.C. 1103 (1950); Escanaba & L.S.R.R., 24
B.T.A. 412 (1931); Alemeda Steam Laundry Assn, 4 B.T.A. 1080 (1926); Arthur
Kaiser, 2 B.T.A. 609 (1925); cf. Schuman Carriage Co., 43 B.T.A. 880 (1941);
Daily Record Co., 13 B.T.A. 458 (1928). But if the Commissioner does not impose
the conditions, the Tax Court may not impose them for him. Ross v. Commissioner,
169 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948).
208. 184 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950).
209. Under the Tax Court view, a taxpayer simply changing his method of
reporting income without permission is still subject to the adjustment require-
ments of the Commissioner. Stanford R. Brookshire, 31 T.C. No. 119 (Mar. 18,
1959), on appeal, 4th Cir.; Advance Truck Co., 29 T.C. 666, aff'd, 262 F.2d 388
(9th Cir. 1958) ; Josef Patchen, 27 T.C. 592 (1956), rev'd on this issue, 258 F.2d
544 (5th Cir. 1958); William H. Goodrich, 25 T.C. 1235 (1956), rev'd 243 F.2d
686 (8th Cir. 1957); Elbridge L. Walker, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 443 (1956).
210. 82 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1936).
211. See supra note 178. Accord, Welp v. United States, 201 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir. 1953), reversing 103 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Iowa 1952). The lower court's
opinion in WeIp discusses many of the decisions on this problem.
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The gentle art of legal distinction was triumphant. If the method
of reporting income did not clearly reflect the income of the taxpayer,
but his books did, no change in the method of accounting was required.
It was merely a change in the method of reporting income.212 The
Commissioner had no clear-reflection power to pyramid income in
such a situation. This subordination of the paramount task of report-
ing income to the purely ancillary and mechanical operation of keep-
ing records213 came by the enthusiastic approval of the Second Cir-
cuit2i4 and the Tax Court.211 Following rumblings of an inclination of
the former to overrule William Hardy, Inc.,211 the Tax Court aban-
doned this legal fantasy spun on the rock of accounting reality, 1" just
as the gentlemen on Capitol Hill ostensibly were providing a legis-
lative solution to the problem.2 18
212. Gus Blass Co., 18 T.C. 261, 266 (1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1953).
213. Judge Opper, dissenting in Robert G. Frame, 16 T.C. 600, 605 (1951).
214. Commissioner v. Dwyer, 203 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1953); Caldwell v. Com-
missioner, 202 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1953); Commissioner v. Schuyler, 196 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1952) ; Commissioner v. Cohn, 196 F.2d 1019 (2d. Cir. 1952), affirming per
curiam 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 399 (1951).
215. E. S. Iley, 19 T.C. 631 (1952); Robert G. Frame, 16 T.C. 600 (1951);
George V. Gilbert, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 535 (1952); Daniel Montgomery, 20 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 510 (1951).
216. Even if the Second Circuit were "to turn a deaf ear to the compulsions of
logic." Caldwell v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 112, 116 (1953); Commissioner v.
Dwyer, 203 F.2d 522, 523 (1953).
217. See W. Cleve Stokes, 22 T.C. 415 (1954); D. E. Alexander, 22 T.C. 234
(1954); Clement A. Bauman, 22 T.C. 7 (1954); David W. Hughes, 22 T.C. 1
(1954); Jesse Werner, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 816 (1954).
218. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 481(a), as originally enacted, provided that if a
taxpayer's income be computed under a method of accounting different from that
used in the preceding year, then there should be taken into account those adjust-
ments which were determined to be necessary solely by reason of the change in
order to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted, "except that there
shall not be taken into account any adjustment in respect of any taxable year to
which this section does not apply." In the event that the increase in taxable
income resulting from the year of change adjustments exceeded $3,000, then the
increase was to be taken into account pro rata, one-third in the year of change and
one-third in each of the two preceding years, unless the taxpayer established his
actual taxable income for the preceding years computed under the new method.
The quoted language evoked considerable discussion as to whether a taxpayer
could accomplish a "windfall" by changing from the cash to the accrual method
on January 1, 1954. If the taxpayer was correctly reporting his pre-1954 income
on a cash basis, change to the accural basis appeared to constitute a change of
method requiring the consent of the Commissioner. The consensus was that the
Commissioner, in such event, could require as the price of consent the adding of
beginning inventories and net receivables to income in the year of change. If
the taxpayer was reporting incorrectly on the cash basis in 1953, and changed
to the correct accrual basis in 1954, he might have been able to take into account
opening receivables and inventories in 1954 without penalty. See Montgomery,
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Accounts As a Basis of Income
The income tax law requires all taxpayers except those whose gross
income is derived solely from compensation for personal services or
farming21i to keep such permanent books of accounts and records as
are sufficient to establish gross income and deductions. 220 They fail to
do so at their peril.22 1 Ostensibly, such accounts serve the primary
purpose of permitting the taxpayer to ascertain and the Commis-
Federal Taxes 20-12 (36th ed. 1955); Green, Adopting and Changing Accounting
Methods and Periods, N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1489, 1502 (1956); Burns,
Accounting Periods and Methods of Accounting, U. So. Cal. 1955 Tax Inst. 123,
148-149; cf. Alta Co-op. Elevator, P-H 1959 Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1 59,033.
The Commissioner was not unmindful of this potential benefit, intended by
statute though it may have been. He sought presumably to protect the revenues by
announcing first that he would not act upon applications for permission to change
the method of accounting which involved adjustments under § 481 until regulations
had been issued under §§ 446 and 481. News Release, 1956 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 3,
at 32. A year later the Service announced that "in view of the announced con-
sideration of technical problems in connection with section 481 . . . and the con-
sequent possibility of legislation which would amend this section," proposed
regulations would not then be issued. Notice, 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 9, at 38.
The delay was further lengthened by the requirement that requests for action
on applications for change of accounting method, although already on file, b3
renewed "subsequent to the issuance of final regulations."
The final regulations were adopted under § 446 on December 24, 1957, and
under § 481 on February 19, 1959. The waiting game was successful. By this
time Congress had been made to see the error of its ways. Section 481 was amended
by § 29 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, to provide that a taxpayer
who initiated a change in accounting method for pre-1954 Code years was required
to make adjustments for "omissions and duplications." 72 Stat. 1066.
219. Precisely, in the 1939 regulations, a person "whose gross income ...
arises solely from the business of growing and selling products of the soil." Treas.
Reg. 118, § 39.54-1 (1953). The new regulations under the 1954 Code specify
only "the business of farming." Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(b) (1959).
220. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6001; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 54, 53
Stat. 28. The mechanical process of keeping accounts is not prescribed by statute.
Such accounts may be recorded in an elaborate set of books, in mere memoranda,
or only in the brain of the taxpayer. Charles A. Collin, 1 B.T.A. 305, 308 (1925) ;
cf. Klempner v. Glenn, 82 F. Supp. 626 (W.D. Ky. 1949). "He has got to look in
the books. He cannot make it from his head, counsel; he cannot make an income
tax return from his head. He has got to make it from the books." Yorkville Live
Poultry Co., 18 B.T.A. 47,48 (1929).
221. Schwarz v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D. Wis. 1956). A
taxpayer who is unable to establish proof of his deductions may be entitled to
some approximation thereof, although such approximation may bear heavily upon
the taxpayer, "whose inexactitude is of his own making." Cohan v. Commissioner,
39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930); cf. Nellis v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 890
(6th Cir. 1956); G. Herberger, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 516 (1950), aff'd on other
grounds, 195 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1952); H. L. Scales, 10 B.T.A. 1024 (1928).
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sioner, upon examination, to verify taxable income.2 2 Neither the
Commissioner nor the courts, however, have shown evidence of any
disposition to accept the "sel-serving declarations in the taxpayer's
accounts"2 23 as conclusive evidence of his income.22 4 The reinforcing
requirements of regulatory agencies and of certified public account-
ants seemingly add little to the stature of "mere" accounting.22
The courts have zealously guarded their own power and that of the
Commissioner to determine taxable income without regard to account-
ing rules prescribed by other and sometimes more venerable federal
and state regulatory bodies.226 If there is no conflict between the re-
quirements of the second agency and those of the Commissioner, they
graciously admit that the taxpayer's adherence to those of the former
lends an element of consistency and soundness to its accounting prac-
tices.22 7 But in the event of varying criteria, the Supreme Court's
decision in Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner 2 2  left no doubt that
taxable income was not to be determined by alien artists:
The rules of accounting enforced upon a carrier by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission are not binding upon the Commis-
sioner, nor may he resort to the rules of that body, made for
other purposes, for the determination of tax liability under the
revenue acts.
229
222. The revenue acts having accepted the fundamental proposition that the
basis for income returns should, so far as possible, be that upon which the books
are kept. Magill, Taxable Income 176 (1936 ed.).
223. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
224. But see Osterloh v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1930). Always to accept
for tax purposes the accounts as shown by the books would violate not only the
tax objective of uniformity, but also the objective of preventing tax avoidance.
Blough, Federal Income Tax Reporting, in Corporate Financial Statements 117, 120
(Kester ed. 1940).
225. See Proximity Mfg. Co., 22 B.T.A. 1153, 1158 (1931); Bruce & Human
Drug Co., 1 B.T.A. 342 (1925); American Inst. Accountants, 1943-1944 Yearbook
132, 134 (1944); cf. Robert Gage Coal Co., 2 T.C. 488 (1943); Treas. Reg. 130,
§ 448-2(e) (2) (1953) (excess profits tax).
226. In 1906 the Interstate Commerce Commission was given the power not only
to prescribe uniform financial statements, but also to specify the exact accounts
to be kept by the regulated carriers. 34 Stat. 584. See Stewart, Accounting and
Regulatory Bodies in the United States, 50th Anniversary Celebration 133, 139
(1937); Brundage, Influence of Government Regulation on Today's Accounting
Practices, Selected Readings in Accounting 132 (Murphy ed. 1952). Accounting
system prescribed by mere private entities would seem doomed to a similar fate.
But see Melvin E. Tunningley, 22 T.C. 1108 (1954).
227. Boston & M.R.R. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1953);
Kauai Terminal, Ltd., 36 B.T.A. 893, 898 (1937); Central R.R.N.J., 35 B.T.A.
501, 505 (1937).
228. 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
229. 284 U.S. at 562. Accord, Gulf, M. & N.R.R. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d
788, 792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 574 (1936); New York Cent. R.R. v.
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The effect of this language generally has been to insulate the rev-
enues against encroachment by the accounting regulations of any
other administrative agency. The fact that the retirement method of
accounting is required by the Interstate Commerce Commission, for
example, does not mean that the railroad is required to use that
method for federal income tax purposes.23 0 Interest charged on the
taxpayer's own funds used in construction does not constitute taxable
income. ' 1 If the taxpayer maintains its books on a cash basis, it
must report interest income on that basis, although the regulations of
the Comptroller of the Currency require its accrual. 232 The require-
ment of a state insurance commission that annual reports be filed
showing income on a cash basis and deductions on an accrual basis
does not make such a hybrid system permissible for reporting income
for tax purposes.-" The mandatory write-offs of the costs of a title
abstract plant pursuant to the requirements of the state insurance
commission-4I or the write-off of the excess of cost over "original use"
cost pursuant to the orders of the Federal Power Commission are not
binding upon the revenue authorities, although perhaps fully war-
ranted by conservative accounting practice.235 Public utilities required
by their regulatory bodies to defer unearned revenues may be never-
Commissioner, 79 F.2d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 1935); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. United
States, 5 F. Supp. 7, 10 (E.D. Va. 1983); Grand Rapids & I. Ry. v. Doyle, 245
Fed. 792, 796 (W.D. Mich. 1915); Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. United States, 135
F. Supp. 416 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Barretville Bank & Trust Co., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
640 (1958); see Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., 26 T.C. 427 (1956); Rev. Rul. 56-630,
1956 Cum. Bull. 964. But see Atlas Oil & Ref. Corp., 17 T.C. 733 (1951); Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry., 13 B.T.A. 988, 1023 (1928), aff'd, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931); Great No. Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225, 265 (1927); cf. North-
western Improvement Co., 14 B.T.A. 79 (1928).
230. St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1941).
If it has consistently used the retirement method, however, it cannot use the re-
tirement method for property acquired before 1913 and the depreciation method
for property acquired subsequent to such date. Central R.R.N.J., 35 B.T.A. 501
(1927); cf. Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1940).
231. O.D. 1061, 5 Cum. Bull. 206 (1921); O.D. 246, 1 Cum. Bull. 212 (1919);
see O.D. 811, 4 Cum. Bull. 276 (1921); 1 Moonitz & Staehling, Accounting Analy-
sis 334 (1950).
232. First Nat'l Bank, 4 B.T.A. 317 (1926). Bad debts charged off pursuant to
the specific orders of the banking examiners are conclusively presumed, for in-
come tax purposes, to have become worthless to the extent charged off. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.166-2(d) (1959); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-1 (1953); Pacific Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 91 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1937); cf. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 33 B.T.A.
758, 761 (1935).
233. Continental Life Ins. Co., 5 B.T.A. 407 (1926).
234. Suffolk Title & Guar. Co., 2 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 491 (1933).
235. Gulf Power Co., 10 T.C. 852, 857 (1948).
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theless required to include such fares in taxable income in the year
of receipt.
23
G
The rationale underlying the Old Colony rule is not always ap-
parent. Euphemistically, it may be emphasized, as the Supreme Court
did in that case, that the rules of other regulatory agencies are made
for entirely different purposes under other acts of Congress.2 ,7 On the
other hand, fear that the taxing authority's recognition of the regu-
lations of another agency would not be reciprocated, that such agency
would in effect control the assessment of taxes for entities under its
jurisdiction, perhaps promulgating unduly favorable procedures, 23 8
probably must account in part for the conclusion, however purposeful,
that each in its own domain must discharge its duties as prescribed
by the statutes.239 The only loser is, of course, the taxpayer, who must
keep his accounts in one way for one governmental agency and in a
different way for another; and apparently he may expect amelioration
of the situation only by way of statute.24
0
If accounting's role in the federal tax structure has been somewhat
uncertain, the function of that mechanical process of keeping accounts
known as bookkeeping has been even more narrowly circumscribed.
In spite of this catholic condemnation of the elementary art of "mere
bookkeeping, 24'1 unassuming journal entries sometimes produce de-
ficiency or refund for the unwary taxpayer.
The law is clear that mere bookeeping entries of the taxpayer, or
236. Bremerton-Tacoma Stages, Inc. v. Squire, 96 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Wash.
1951); National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947); East Penn. Transp. Co., 16
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 917 (1947). But see Mutual Tel. Co. v. United States, 204
F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1953).
237. See also Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir.
1943); Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 31 B.T.A. 730, 737 (1934), aft'd, 81 F.2d 309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936).
238. Winter Garden Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Phinney, 139 F. Supp. 213, 216
(S.D. Tex. 1955). Favoritism is not altogether peculiar to agencies other than the
Internal Revenue Service. See, e.g., the provisions for bad debt deductions of
savings and loan associations, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 593.
239. Kansas City So. Ry., 22 B.T.A. 949, 961 (1931), rev'd, 75 F.2d 786 (8th
Cir. 1935). See also Kansas City So. Ry. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.,
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 676 (1931), cited with approval in Old Colony.
240. National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159, 162 (1947). Failure to keep books as
required by the ICC may subject the taxpayer to criminal penalties. Advance
Truck Co., 29 T.C. 666, aff'd, 262 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1958). See generally 3 CCH
1959 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 2815.012.
241. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Co., 71 F.2d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 1934);
Robert P. Hyams Coal Co. v. United States, 26 F.2d 805 (E.D. La. 1928); Cook v
United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 343, 3 F. Supp. 47 (1933). Accountants probably cannot
blame the law for this nomer. See Hatfield, cited in 7 Certified Public Accountant
355 (1927).
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those of a third party,24 2 cannot preclude the Government from col-
lecting its revenues.243 "To say that book entries control would permit
tax statutes to be circumvented by skillful accountants. ' '244 Book-
keeping entries in some circumstances are of evidential value, but
they are not determinative of tax liability,245 being neither indis-
pensable nor conclusive. 24  Bookkeeping entries do not create income
where none in fact exists ;-7 they do not enlarge the scope of the
statutory deductions.24 The manner in which the accounts are kept
will be disregarded for tax purposes if the manner of keeping the
records distorts realities.L- The actual facts must control.20
242. Southern Ry. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1935) ; In re Trustees
Sys. Co., 30 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Ky. 1939); Watson-Moore Co., 30 B.T.A. 1197
(1934); A.R.R. 6242, 11-1 Cum. Bull. 20 (1924); cf. Duffn v. Lucas, 55 F.2d 786
(6th Cir. 1932). Amounts credited to an accrual basis taxpayer on the books
of a third party may be taxable to him when credited. Compare Commissioner v.
Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Shoemaker-Nash, Inc., 41 B.T.A. 417 (1940); S. W.
Harris, 2 B.T.A. 933 (1925) with Johnson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 752 (4th
Cir. 1956) ; Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1944);
Farmers Grain Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Iowa 1953).
243. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179 (1918); Southern Pac. R.R. v.
Muenter, 260 Fed. 837 (9th Cir. 1919); Haugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer
Co. v. Heiner, 20 F.2d 921 (W.D. Pa. 1927); Corn Exch. Bank, 6 B.T.A. 158,
162 (1927).
244. Commissioner v. Goldwyn, 175 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1949).
245. Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); cf.
Goodman, Inc., 23 T.C. 288, 301 (1954). "The evidentiary value of a bookkeeping
entry is further weakened when it obviously is one that is strange to accepted
bookkeeping practice." C. H. Wentworth, 25 T.C. 1210, 1213 (1956).
246. Robert P. Hyams Coal Co. v. United States, 26 F.2d 805 (E.D. La. 1928);
In re Sheinman, 14 F.2d 323 (E.D. Pa. 1926); Maney Milling Co., 14 B.T.A. 1001
(1929).
247. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Huston, 126 F.2d 196, 199
(8th Cir. 1942) ; Sitterding v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1936) ; B. F.
Goodrich Co., 1 T.C. 1098 (1943); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner,
24 B.T.A. 599, 621 (1931), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.2d 424 (4th
Cir. 1933); James W. Everhart, 26 B.T.A. 318 (1932); Luther Elkins, 12 B.T.A.
1058 (1928) ; cf. Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 103 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1939) ;
Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
248. Harry N. Gifford, 3 B.T.A. 334, 339 (1926).
249. Adams Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1955).
250. Lashell's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 1953);
Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1942);
Farmers Grain Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Iowa
1953) ; Huning Mercantile Co., 1 B.T.A. 130, 132 (1924). But cf. Sam E. Wilson,
Jr., 20 T.C. 505, 509 (1953).
Erroneous accounting treatment does not preclude establishment of the true
facts. In re Wolslagel, 104 F. Supp. 68 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Robert J. Dial, 24 T.C.
117, 126 (1955); George S. Groves, 38 B.T.A. 727, 736 (1938); E. P. Greenwood,
34 B.T.A. 1209 (1936); Henry Myer Thread Mfg. Co., 2 B.T.A. 665 (1925).
But cf. Sammons v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1949). If the error is
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As a general rule, bookkeeping entries do not determine the year in
which an item of income is properly taxable or a deduction properly
allowable.2 51 The soundness of the method of accounting employed is
no sesame as to items in respect of which entries are made in dis-
regard thereof. 2 2 The failure to accrue items of income and expense
in the accounts of the taxpayer2 53 does not preclude their includability
in or deductibility from taxable income.25 4 However, entries trans-
ferring to profit and loss or surplus accounts credit balances in deposit
accounts,255 accrued liability accounts,2 5 6 and unclaimed wages ac-
corrected within the taxable year, the taxpayer is not bound by the original
erroneous entry. Huntington-Redondo Co., 36 B.T.A. 116 (1937); George E.
Mickel, 5 B.T.A. 979 (1926).
251. United States v. Huntington Labs., Inc., 82 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1936);
Commissioner v. North Jersey Title Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1935); Gould
Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934); Heinz v. Granger, 147
F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n, 25 B.T.A. 544, 552
(1932); Ohio Brass Co., 17 B.T.A. 1199, 1203 (1929); A. J. Schwarzler Co., 3
B.T.A. 535, 538 (1926); cf. Fort Wayne Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 2 B.T.A. 1223 (1925).
The deduction for partially worthless bad debts is a statutory exception to
this rule, the law permitting their deduction only to the extent charged off during
the year. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166 (a). Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942,
the charge-off requirement was applicable to both partially worthless and wholly
worthless bad debts. A taxpayer having no books was required only to claim the
amount as a deduction on his tax returns. See Cammack v. United States, 113
F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1940); Harder v. Helvering, 106 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 617 (1939).
See the function of the taxpayer's method of accounting, note 132 supra and
text supported thereby.
252. Boston & M.R.R., 16 T.C. 1517, 1552 (1951).
253. Or their entry in the books of the wrong taxpayer. Norwich Woolen Mills
Corp., 18 B.T.A. 303, 306 (1929).
254. Income: Commissioner v. Goldberger's Estate, 213 F.2d 78 (3d Cir.
1954); Commissioner v. Union Pac. R.R., 86 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1936); Permanent
Home Lands Co., 27 B.T.A. 142 (1932); G. M. Standifer Constr. Corp., 30 B.T.A.
184 (1934); cf. M & E Corp., 7 T.C. 1276 (1946).
Deductions: Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940), aff'd,
125 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1942); Wolf Mfg. Co., 10 B.T.A. 1161 (1928); Savinar
Co., 9 B.T.A. 465 (1927); Canton Art Metal Co., 6 B.T.A. 446 (1927). Book-
keeping entries do not constitute payment so as to entitle a cash basis taxpayer
to a deduction in the year the entry is made. Nehring v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d
790 (7th Cir. 1942); J. & J. W. Williams, Inc., 9 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 191 (1940).
255. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 6 (5th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 806 (1946) ; Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner,
128 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1942). But see Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Huston, 126 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1942).
256. Amsco-Wire Prods. Corp., 44 B.T.A. 717 (1941); Howard Paper Co., 43
B.T.A. 545 (1941); Beacon Auto Stores, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 703 (1940). But see
Troy Mfg. Co., 7 B.T.A. 119 (1927).
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counts -57 are generally deemed to result in income in the year trans-
ferred, ostensibly because they "free assets to the unfettered use of
the taxpayer. ' '2-
Bookkeeping entries adjusting controlling account balances in ac-
counts receivable and accounts payable to agree with the details of
subsidiary records constitute taxable income or allowable deductions
only if the adjustments are shown to pertain to the taxable year in
question.L" Journal entries representing adjustments for income
improperly accrued in prior years do not give rise to allowable de-
ductions in the year made*'" In requiring that the adjustments relate
to the taxable year, the taxing authorities, perhaps unwittingly, have
thus evidenced a preference for the net operating concept, as dis-
tinguished from the "clean surplus" theory of prior years' adjust-
ments.
2 01
It is difficult to surmise whether the long-standing judicial re-
luctance to accept the taxpayer's accounts as the best evidence of his
257. Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1931);
Providence Coal Mining Co. v. Glenn, 88 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Ky. 1950); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 23 B.T.A. 888 (1931).
258. Lime Cola Co., 22 T.C. 593, 602 (1954); accord, Roxy Custom Clothes
Corp. v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 851 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Texas Gas Distrib. Co.,
3 T.C. 57 (1944); cf. United States v. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398
(1927); Michigan Cent. R.R., 28 B.T.A. 437, 460 (1933). But see S. Rossin & Sons,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 652 (2d. Cir. 1940); North Am. Coal Corp. v.
Commisisoner, 97 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1938) (write-off of accounts payable); Palm
Beach Mather Co., 24 B.T.A. 536 (1931) (write-off of bad debt reserve balances);
New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 23 B.T.A. 177 (1931) (transfer from suspense to
profit and loss); and Summit Coal Co., 18 B.T.A. 983 (1930) (transfer from un-
earned income to profit and loss), all of which hold in effect that amounts become
income in the year in which the reason for the liability account ceases to exist,
not in the year in which the taxpayer chooses to transfer the balance to income.
259. Milligan & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1265 (N.D.
Iowa 1954); Pittsburgh Industrial Eng'r Co., 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1038 (1950);
Hart Furniture Co., 12 T.C. 1103 (1949), rev'd on other grounds, 188 F.2d 968
(5th Cir. 1950); Albert Nelson, 6 T.C. 764 (1946); Wilson Furniture Co., 10
B.T.A. 1294 (1928); Cooper-Brannan Naval Stores Co., 9 B.T.A. 105 (1927);
cf. Renier Music House, Inc., 15 B.T.A. 241 (1929). Similarly, as to adjustments
to the bank account. Reinschmidt v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1928).
260. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 23 B.T.A. 829 (1931); cf. Joyce-Koebel Co., 6
B.T.A. 403 (1927).
261. See Finney & Miller, Principles of Accounting 111 (4th ed. 1951). In
Evens & Howard Fire Brick Co., 8 B.T.A. 867 (1927), the Board permitted the
deduction of a debit balance in an account called "current surplus," in which the
taxpayer recorded all prior year adjustments, the taxpayer having followed the
practice of reporting any credit balances as income. The practice was deemed to
be permissible under Treas. Reg. 62, art. 111 (1922), which sanctioned "certain
overlapping in income and deductions, so long as they do not materially distort
income." See Kansas City So. Ry. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1935).
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income stems from an inherent distrust of the taxpayer, suspicion of
his accountant, a lack of knowledge of accounting, a knowledge of
same, or simply a desire to retain within the realm of legal mysticism,
and hence within the control of the judiciary, the infinite details of
the administration of the federal income tax law. Whatever the
reason, the result is the same-an ever-increasing volume of dollar
litigation in forums whose time and efforts might better be devoted
to more pressing problems of policy.
III. CASH AND ACCRUAL METHODS
Accounting measurements of income on a cash basis generally have
followed closely the view that such determinations should reflect only
cash input and outflow, without modifications. 2 2 In the federal income
tax law the cash method for the assignment of income to a particular
taxable year invariably has been less sharply defined; the cash cor-
poreality has been assuaged in some degree by such modifications as
the tax enforcing authorities have deemed appropriate to safeguard
the revenues, or in some instances, merely have deemed appropriate.
Accounting concepts of the accrual basis of accounting have de-
veloped largely in conjunction with the rising prominence of the in-
come statement and the resulting emphasis upon the matching of costs
and revenues.263 Accounting's solutions to the problems of year-end
adjustments designed to sharpen the periodic determinations of rev-
enue largely have accompanied rather than preceded the development
of the accrual method of accounting for federal income tax purposes.
Faced with the necessity of an immediate answer to its questions and
unable to await the leisurely mold of accepted accounting practice, the
tax law has often promulgated its own criteria in its own inimitable
fashion. The resulting divergencies have created stress and strain
between the legal and accounting professions, 264 have fostered well-
262. Cf. Finney & Miller, Principles of Accounting ch. 28, Statements of
Application of Funds (4th ed. 1951).
263. See Matching Costs and Revenues, supra p. 9.
264. Lasser & Peloubet, Tax Accounting v. Commercial Accounting, 4 Tax L.
Rev. 343 (1949); May, Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of
Income Taxation, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 377 (1947); Gutkin & Beck, Tax Accounting
v. Business Accounting: The Emasculation of Section 41, 79 J. Accountancy 130
(1945). For a time, at least, this popular diversion lost its first place rating to
the topic of the unwarranted invasion of the accountant's federal income tax
practice by the bar committees on unauthorized practice, a subject ostensibly
dearer to heart and purse. See, e.g., Carey, CPA's in Treasury Practice, 5 J.
Taxation 42 (1956); Jameson, Co-operation Between the Legal and Accounting
Professions, 102 J. Accountancy 42 (Nov. 1956); Editorial, The Agran Case in
Perspective, 102 J. Accountancy 29 (Dec. 1956).
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meaning if ill-fated legislative reform,263 and generally have over-
shadowed the substantial similarities between the two.
Cash Bases of Accounting
On its surface, at least, the cash basis of accounting boasts a great
deal of seductive simplicity. Reduced to its simplest form,2 6 the cash
method consists merely of determining the amount of cash received
and the amount disbursed.2, Income is not recognized until it has
been received in cash, and expenses are ignored until paid in cash.268
Cash receipts less disbursements constitute the profit, disbursements
less receipts the loss.28 Unfortunately, much of this crystalline clarity
has been dissipated by accountants careless of pen, lawyers chary of
accounting, and connissioners careful of revenue.
The nomadic nomenclature suggests that there are at least two cash
baseS2 °0 of accounting: the "pure" or "cash" cash basis, and the "im-
pure" or "accrual" cash basis. The former sets its terms and limita-
tions by the transactions of the bank account. Income, from whatever
source derived, is taken into account only when received in cash. Pur-
chases are regarded as costs chargeable against income in the period
in which made; no consideration is given to inventories. Performance
of services is not deemed to give rise to income until such services
are collected for in cash; cash collections for services to be performed
265. Sections 452 and 462 of the 1954 Code, as it was originally enacted, were
"designed to bring the income tax provisions of the law into harmony with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
48 (1954). Section 452 contained somewhat elaborate provisions permitting the
deferral to a subsequent year of a portion of certain types of prepaid income
received during the taxable year "until earned in the manner required by the
taxpayer's method of accounting." Section 462 provided simply that a taxpayer
other than one on the cash basis could elect to deduct a reasonable addition to
reserves for estimated expenses.
The reformation was short-lived, apparently because the Secretary of the
Treasury had failed to estimate accurately the potential loss of revenues arising
primarily from the enthusiastic adoption by the taxpayers and their accountants,
or at least their "tax advisers," of the reserves for estimated expenses. In any
event the sections were retroactively repealed June 15, 1955. 69 Stat. 134. See
Cohen, The Impact of the New Revenue Code upon Accounting, 31 Accounting Rev.
206 (1956); Seidman, Taxes: Friend or Foe?, 100 J. Accountancy 51 (Nov.
1955); Bierman & Helstein, Accounting for Prepaid Income and Estimated Ex-
penses under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 10 Tax L. Rev. 83 (1954).
266. As perhaps there it should be.
267. Ferst, Basic Accounting for Lawyers 15 (1950).
268. MacFarland & Ayers, Accounting Fundamentals 37 (2d ed. 1947).
269. A statement of cash receipts and disbursements is in fact a mere formal
rearrangement of the information contained in the cash book. Gilman 253.
270. Or perhaps one method and one basis, or one method which includes two
bases. See supra note 131.
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in the future are regarded as income when received although nothing
has been done to earn them. Bad debt expense does not appear upon
the income statement because no income is taken into account until
the receivable is collected. Depreciation expense likewise is absent
because the entire cost of the fixed asset is regarded as an expense of
the period in which it is purchased.2 71 This is income on a pure or
cash cash basis, despite its lack of correlation with the customary ac-
counting concepts of the profits of the business enterprise.
2 2
The impure or accrual cash basis was not so much an accounting
theory as a label, carelessly cast by accountants in their zeal to con-
vince themselves and others of the inherent superiority of the "new"
accrual method over one which accounted only for inventories, re-
ceivables, and payables. 273 Its sole function has been to interpose
somewhere among the "pure" cash basis, the cash method of the
federal income tax law, the accrual basis of accounting, and the legal
concept of the accrual method. It has contributed little except con-
fusion to a category already abundantly supplied.27
4
"The" Cash Method
The cash method of accounting in the federal income tax law was
conceived in the early confusion surrounding the conflicting law and
regulations under the Revenue Acts of 1909 and 1913,271 nurtured by
the conflict in accounting circles attendant to "cash bases of account-
ing,"278 and modulated by legislative, administrative, and judicial
governors attuned to the country's needs for revenue. That it has
271. Finney & Miller, Principles of Accounting 19 (4th ed. 1951). See also
Karrenbrock & Simons, Intermediate Accounting 99-100 (2d ed. 1953); Saliers &
Holmes, Basic Accounting Principles 60-61 (1937).
272. This assumption that each period is complete within itself and that no
inventory of receivables for services rendered and no inventory of services re-
mains is "the precise antithesis of the requirement inherent in the circumstances
under which a going concern endeavors to keep going indefinitely." 1 Moonitz &
Staehling, Accounting Analysis 114 (1950).
The excess of cash receipts over cash disbursements will equal net profit if:
1. All goods bought during the period are sold, or the beginning inventory is
equal in amount to the ending inventory;
2. The benefits of all expenditures accrue to the period in which made;
3. All income received is earned;
4. All sales are collected;
5. All purchases are paid for;
6. Capital assets have not been used or purchases equal depreciation.
Kohler & Morrison, Principles of Accounting 166 (1926).
273. Accrual Bases of Accounting, infra p. 49.
274. A condemnation which, it is hoped, the present endeavor may escape.
275. See supra note 97.
276. See Cash Bases of Accounting, supra p. 45.
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survived in all its present strength may probably be better attributed
to its stamina and inherent utility than to the care of its cultivators.
Applied to certain taxpayers, notably individuals, the cash method
of accounting for taxable income possesses at least some of the pris-
tine simplicity of the pure cash basis of accounting. But there are at
once complications. Since the taxpayer's method of accounting does
not determine what is income and what are allowable deductions,
2 77
the charges and credits on his bank statement perforce lose their
power to prescribe taxable income. Hence, the cash method of ac-
counting does not mean that all cash receipts represent taxable in-
come 278 and all disbursements represent statutory deductions.2
79 It
means that all items of taxable income received during the year in
cash are properly includible in income ;2,80 amounts paid during the
year in cash for deductible expenses are properly deducted in arriving
at taxable income. This is the essence of the cash "system" of ac-
counting,2 1 one which the law recognizes as furnishing the "prima
facie correct test" for computing income. 82
Limitations on the cash method of accounting, other than those
imposed by the statute, have stemmed largely from the understand-
able requirement of the Commissioner and the courts that the method
of accounting used by the taxpayer does not give him the power to ex-
tend the scope of the statutory deductions. 28 3 Two of the three require-
ments early84 imposed by the regulations on all methods of account-
ing insulate the revenues against the wiles of the cash-basis taxpayer:
expenditures made during the year for items of plant and equipment
having a useful life extending beyond one year must be charged to a
capital account and not deducted in their entirety in the year of pur-
277. See supra notes 134, 135.
278. Life insurance proceeds paid by reason of the death of the insured, certain
other death benefits, cash received by way of gift or inheritance, interest on
governmental obligations of states or territories, and amounts received as scholar-
ships, are, inter alia, cash receipts which do not represent taxable income. See Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 101, 102, 103, 117.
279. Expenditures for personal living expenses, life insurance premiums, capital
expenditures, and expenses relating to tax-exempt income are not deductible. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 262-265.
280. Int. Rev. Code of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 23. Items received in
property and those constructively received are also required to be included. See
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1 (a) (3) (1957); 1.451-1 (a) (1957); Treas. Reg. 118, §§
39.41-1, 39.42-2, -3 (1953).
281. Eckert v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1930), aft'd, 283 U.S.
140 (1931) ; see In re Newman, 94 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1938).
282. Morris-Poston Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 620, 621 (6th Cir. 1930).
283. Extension of the scope of taxable income these parties have left primarily
to Congress.
284. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 24 (1919) ; Reg. 33, rev. art. 91, 92 (1918).
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chase ;285 in all instances in which the production, purchase, or sale of
merchandise is an income-producing factor, beginning and ending
inventories of merchandise on hand must be used in the computation
of net income for the year.288
While the necessity of these specifications may not be in doubt,287
their theoretical consistency may be. Since they apply to both cash
and accrual basis taxpayer alike, they yield the somewhat incongruous
result that a taxpayer on the cash basis may be required to use both
inventories288 and depreciation,28 9 concepts which have been termed
the essence of the accrual method.2 90 The regulations thus serve to
blur in some degree the distinction between the cash and the accrual
basis, from either the accounting or the legal viewpoint.291 They do
make one thing abundantly clear, however; the taxpayer does not
have an option to report on the "pure" cash basis of accounting. 2 12
285. See Julia Stow Lovejoy, 18 B.T.A. 1179 (1930); Marjorie Post Hutton,
12 B.T.A. 265 (1928), aff'd, 39 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1930); Washington Land Co.,
10 B.T.A. 503 (1928). Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 263(a) (1); Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(a) (2), 53 Stat. 16; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 215 (b),
40 Stat. 1069.
This specific disallowance of capital expenditures for "plant and equipment" has
lured the Commissioner into some strange classifications. See Waldheim Realty &
Inv. Co., 25 T.C. 1216 (1956), rev'd, 245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957) (prepaid in-
surance) ; cf. Robert S. Bassett, 26 T.C. 619 (1956) (prepaid medical expenses);
Rev. Rul. 58-53, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 152 (prepaid trustee fees).
286. See American Can Co. v. Bowers, 35 F.2d 832, 836 (2d Cir. 1929); J. P.
Bass Publishing Co., 12 B.T.A. 728 (1928); Newlove, Smith & White, Inter-
mediate Accounting 138 (1939); cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 471; Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(c), 53 Stat. 11; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 203, 40 Stat.
1060. See supra note 152.
The third requirement specifies that if the cost of assets is being recovered
through depreciation, any expenditure made to restore the property or prolong
its useful life must be charged to the depreciation reserve account or to a capital
account. Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 263(a) (2) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1,
§ 24(a) (3), 53 Stat. 16; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 215 (e), 40 Stat. 1069.
287. But see Glenn v. Kentucky Color & Chem. Co., 186 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.
1951).
288. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(b) (2) (i) (1957): cf. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2
(1953); Treas. Reg. 45, art. 23(1) (1919). Under the 1954 Code the taxpayer
may use the accrual method for purchases and sales and report other items on a
cash basis, thus adopting the "impure" cash basis: Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (iv)
(1957); H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 835 (1954); see Omah Mac-
Donald, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 179 (1949); Bob H. McGinnis, 4 B.T.A. 209 (1926);
Dohr, The Board of Tax Appeals and Net Income, 41 J. Accountancy 427-430
(1926).
289. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167 (a).
290. See Diamond A Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 739, 741 (10th Cir.
1956); Saliers, Depreciation Accounting Principles and Application 252 (1939);
Accountants' Handbook 1082 (Paton ed. 1934).
291. Kohler, Accounting Principles 34 (1924).
292. D. E. Alexander, 22 T.C. 234, 241 (1954).
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Accrual Bases of Accounting
As a process of the accrual of income from sales through the recog-
nition of accounts receivable arising at the time of the sales and the
accrual of liabilities by the entering of accounts payable at the time
the expenditures are incurred, the accrual basis of accounting was
generally accepted in the United States prior to 1900.293 Recognition
of deferred items of income and expense as a process of year-end
adjustment and promulgation of definite standards for the accruals
of income and expenditures were so long delayed, however, that these
phases of accrual accounting have furnished little, if any, assistance
to the Commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the judiciary in
the determination of taxable income.
Even as accountants were raising their vehement protests over the
cash basis provisions of the 1909 Revenue Act,29 4 they were themselves
debating the relative merits of the accrual cash basis 95 and the "pure"
or complete accrual basis. The former gave recognition to accounts
receivable, accounts payable, and inventories. To these the latter
added a series of accounting adjustments designed to sharpen yearly
determinations of income. Journal entries were to be made for items
of accrued income which were earned in advance of being received;
for items of unearned income received in advance of being earned;
for prepaid expenses, paid but not incurred; and accrued expenses
incurred but not paid.9';
While accounting texts began to discuss these various items of de-
ferred assets and liabilities about 1910,297 their universal acceptance
was slow in coming. Determinations of the various accruals fre-
quently involved an appreciable amount of individual judgment, and
constructive criteria were sorely lacking. Some accountants feared
that the complete accrual method "opened the door for errors of
judgment and for deliberate misrepresentations, defended by plausible
arguments."s Although the exact date of conversion is elusive,
299 it
293. See Littleton, Accounting Evolution 150 (1933).
294. See supra note 97.
295. See supra note 271. This has been termed the "partial accrual" basis.
Fitzgerald & Schumer, Classification in Accounting 24 (1952).
296. Kester, Principles of Accounting 517-19 (4th ed. 1939).
297. See Greendlinger, Accounting Theory and Practice 6 (1910); Rowe, Book-
keeping and Accounting 133-35 (1910); MacFarland & Rossheim, Bookkeeping
and Accounting 142 (1913).
298. Finney, General Accounting 350 (1941); cf. Finney & Miller, Principles
of Accounting 20 (1951).
299. The Accountants' Handbook 1513 (Saliers ed. 1923), and Bliss, Manage-
ment Through Accounts 117 (1924) gave recognition to the processes of allocating
income and costs to accounting periods by means of year-end adjustments. Hewett,
The Definition of Income 81-82 (1925) rejects the accrual basis of accounting for
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appears probable that this "primary factor in converting fifteenth-
century record keeping" into the "quasistatistical technology" of ac-
counting300 assumed the rigidity of accounting principle as a part of
the shift in emphasis to the income statement and the matching of
costs and revenues. 301
To the completed product, income recorded when earned and ex-
penditures when incurred, plus the year-end adjustments necessary to
match properly costs against revenues, accounting has in recent years
applied the label of the accrual basis of accounting.32 The accrual
basis requires that income be taken up in the period in which it is
earned by sales or services, regardless of when collected. Expenses are
charged to income in the period in which they are incurred, regard-
less of when paid.3 0 3 Bad debts, depreciation, amortization, accrued
income, accrued expenses, income collected in advance, and expenses
paid in advance are properly allocated by adjusting journal entries.304
The central purpose of the method is thus to bring into contrast the
inflowing services acquired and used, as measured by expenses and
costs, and the corresponding outfiowing services rendered, as mea-
sured by income and earnings.30 5 It effects a non-cash allocation of
income to the period responsible for the receipts, and a similar allo-
cation of expenditures to the period which receives the benefit of the
disbursement.30 6
income taxation as impracticable because of "the relatively unsatisfactory nature
of accounting practice in its present stage of development." The writings of the
thirties indicate its further development. The statement in Scott, The Cultural
Significance of Accounts 246 (1931), that the substitution of the accrual basis
for the cash basis in the determination of income "is a change which definitely has
taken place in accounting theory" is probably somewhat premature. See Husband
& Thomas, Principles of Accounting ch. IX, Adjusting the Accounts (1935);
Scovill & Moyer, Fundamentals of Accounting 352-53 (1940).
300. Littleton, Extensions of Accrual Principles Would Help Depreciation
Accounting, 86 J. Accountancy 21 (1948).
301. Ascher, Survey of Accounting 462 (1952).
302. Kester, Advanced Accounting 10 (4th ed. 1946); Finney, supra note
298, at 349; Prickett & Mikesell, Principles of Accounting 140-41 (rev. ed. 1937).
303. Finney & Miller, supra note 298, at 19.
304. Id. at 20; see Ascher, Survey of Accounting 86-87 (1952). Kester, supra
note 302, at 80, defines the accrual method in well-nigk judicial fashion: "the
method of showing all earnings in the period in which they actually accrue is
the 'accrual method'."
305. Littleton, Contrasting Theories of Profit, 11 Accounting Rev. 10 (1936).
See also Holmes & Meier, Elementary Accounting 56 (1949); Fitzgerald &
Schumer, supra note 295, at 28.
306. Husband, That Thing Which the Accountant Calls Income, 21 Accounting
Rev. 247 (1946); Copeland, Suitable Accounting Conventions to Determine Busi-
ness Income, 87 J. Accountancy 107, 111 (1949). The accrual basis has been
termed "a periodically corrected cash basis procedure." I Moonitz & Staehling,
Accounting Analysis 203 (1950).
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Accrual Methods
Unlike the cash receipts and disbursements method, the accrual
method of accounting enjoyed no express statutory recognition prior
to 1954.30, Nor was such method defined by the regulations.308 Left
to the vagaries of judicial definition, the "accrual method of account-
ing" has been somewhat neglected. While not at all hesitant to pro-
mulgate a formidable array of decisions determining when particular
items of income and deduction accrue, the courts have not been overly
ambitious in setting forth definitive concepts of the accrual method
as such.
Early explanations of the term were the by-product of the con-
fusing bit of tax administration embodied in the early revenue acts.
Since the 1916 Act permitted a taxpayer keeping his accounts "upon
any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements" to
make his returns upon the basis upon which his accounts were kept,30 9
the label "accrual method" has sometimes been applied to any method
other than the cash receipts method.3 10 The language in United
States v. Anderson that the purpose of the 1916 provisions was "to
enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns accord-
ing to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income
earned during the taxable period, the expenses incurred in and
properly attributable to the process of earning income during that
period"- has from time to time inspired judicial declarations that
the accrual method of accounting is synonymous with the accounting
process of matching costs and revenues. 312 Likewise, the regulations
promulgated under the early acts permitting the treatment of accounts
receivable as cash received and accounts payable as cash disbursed
have given rise to a definition of the accrual system in terms of a
contrary-to-fact approach. If the receipts be deemed to be received
when accrued and disbursements considered disbursed when incurred,
then the system was on the accrual basis.3 13 Still another definition
307. Ernest M. Bull, 7 B.T.A. 993, 994 (1927); see Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 446(c).
308. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 23 (1919) ; Treas. Reg. 118, §§ 39.41-2, -3 (1953).
309. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8 (g), 13 (d), 39 Stat. 763, 771.
310. American Institute of Accountants Committee on Terminology, Account-
ing Terminology 6 (1931). Presumably in this sense the term would also include
the long-term contract method, the crop method, and the several other special
methods authorized by law, as well as perhaps the installment method.
311. 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926).
312. Citizens Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1942);
Lichtenberger-Ferguson Co. v. Welch, 54 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1931); Galatoire
Bros. v. Lines, 23 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928); American Express Co., 2 B.T.A. 498,
504 (1925).
313. United States v. American Can Co., 280 U.S. 412, 417 (1930); H. Liebes
& Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1937); American Can Co. v.
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has been posed in terms of the admissibility of the entries to the books
of account. If entries are made of credits and debits as the income
or liability arises, whether then received or disbursed, then the books
may be said to be kept on an accrual basis.
3 14
Judicial insistence that the Revenue Act of 1918 authorized two
methods of accounting, the cash and the accrual method,3 1 - neverthe-
less did not promptly produce a definition of "accrual method," as
distinguished from a wild flurry of delineations of the word "ac-
crue.' '316 After displaying a notable reluctance in earlier cases to
assist in the compilation of the lexicon,'3 7 the Supreme Court at length
ventured two tentative premises in its 1934 decisions in Brown V.
Helvering"8 and Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner.31o If the
accounts are kept on an accrual basis, the court opined in the former,
income is to be accounted for in the year in which it is realized, even
if it is not then actually received, and deductions are to be taken in
Bowers, 35 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1929) ; cf. Eckert v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 158,
159 (2d Cir. 1930).
314. Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 24 F.2d 230, 231 (N.D. Ohio 1927),
aft'd, 282 U.S. 92 (1930) ; Selwyn Eddy Co., 25 B.T.A. 1341, 1347 (1932) ; H. H.
Brown Co., 8 B.T.A. 112, 117 (1927); see Flynn v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1935). But cf. Badgley v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1932);
Atlantic & C. Airlines R.R., 36 B.T.A. 558 (1937).
315. See "The" Methods of Accounting, supra p. 16.
316. On this score the courts have been unrestrained. The etymology of
"accrue" is discussed at length, inter alia, in Hartsfield Co. v. Shoaf, 184 Ga. 378,
191 S.E. 693, 695 (1937) and H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932 (9th
Cir. 1937). See also American Institute of Accountants Committee on Termi-
nology, Accounting Terminology 7 (1931).
Despite the extended endeavor, however, the product appears to have been
unrewarding. While "accrue" and its various derivatives are not new to the
nomenclature of accounting or taxation, its use has not sufficed to build it into a
word of art when employed in describing items of gross income. Helvering v.
Enright, 312 U.S. 636, 643 (1941). The word is fraught with confusion because it
expresses no certain concept. It implies the exclusion of "received" or "paid" but
short of this, what is meant when an item is accounted for as accrued depends
upon the system of accounting in which it appears and the breadth of the ac-
countant's concept. Ernest Al. Bull, 7 B.T.A. 993, 995 (1927).
317. See, e.g., Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290
(1932); Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 140 (1931); Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co.,
281 U.S. 115 (1930); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573 (1929); American Nat'l
Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 99 (1927). The direction that net income be com-
puted according to the method of accounting regularly employed by the taxpayer
was, according to this body, "expressly limited to the cases where the Commis-
sioner believes that the accounts clearly reflect the income." Lucas v. American
Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930). Cf. United States v. American Can Co., 280
U.S. 412, 417 (1930).
318. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
319. 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss1/6
METHODS OF ACCOUNTING
the year incurred -0 Its language in Spring City Foundry, although
perhaps less complete, has been much quoted:
Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis,
as distinguished from the cash basis, import that it is the right
to receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion
of the amount in gross income. When the right to receive an
amount becomes fixed, the right accrues. 321
In Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co.322 the court defined the
accrual basis as one under which all the obligations of a company
applicable to a year are listed as expenditures, whether paid that
year or not, and all obligations to it incurred by others applicable to
the year are set up as income on the same basis.
3 23
Despite the sparsity of definitions of the accrual method, as such,
the courts have spawned a host of legal touchstones for the deter-
mination of when particular items of income and deductions accrue.
Of these it may be said generally,32 4 that income accrues when there
arises a fixed or unconditional right to receive32 5 an ascertained or
ascertainable amount,32c coupled with a reasonable expectation that
such right will be converted into money or its equivalent.3 27 A lia-
bility accrues when all events have occurred during the year which
320. 291 U.S. at 199.
321. 292 U.S. at 184-85. See United States v. Harmon, 205 F.2d 919, 920
(10th Cir. 1953); Obmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 682, 686 (6th
Cir. 1942).
322. 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
323. Id. at 498. The right to receive a definite sum as distinguished from its
receipt, and the fixed obligation to pay expenses as distinguished from actual
payment, accrue items for income tax purposes if the taxpayer uses the accrual
system of keeping its books of account. United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,
72 F.2d 755, 759 (10th Cir. 1934) ; see United States v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 96
F.2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1938).
324. And probably only very generally.
325. See Franklin County Distillery Co. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 800, 804
(6th Cir. 1942); Rev. Rul. 58-474, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 158.
326. See Craig v. Thompson, 177 F.2d 457, 460 (8th Cir. 1949); H. Liebes & Co.
v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1937); see Midwest Motor Express,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958);
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Granger, 147 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
327. Swastika Oil & Gas Co., v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 382, 384 (6th Cir.
1941); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 1937); Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1934). See Edwards v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1957); Graham Mill & Elevator Co. v.
Thomas, 152 F.2d 564, 565 (5th Cir. 1945). Is knowledge of the facts giving rise
to the accrual an essential ingredient? Compare Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 31 T.C. 560 (1958) with Harrisburg Steel Corp. v. United States, 142
F. Supp. 626 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
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fix the amount 328 and determine the existence of the liability. 20 These
criteria met, the income or expense must be accrued, whether or not
such items are then payable.330
Determination of Method
Since the year in which an item is properly reportable as income
or allowable as a deduction is by statute expressly dependent upon the
method of accounting employed by the taxpayer, the initial task in
determining temporal propriety is frequently the ascertainment of the
method employed by the taxpayer in keeping his accounts and re-
porting his income.33' The assignment is ofttimes difficult, not only
because the distinction between the cash and accrual method is not
always clearly drawn, 33 2 but also because few taxpayers use either
method exclusively.33 3 The extent to which a taxpayer may depart
from the method he customarily employs to afford varying treat-
ment to individual items of income and deduction has been loosely,
if at all, defined.3 34
The label applied by the taxpayer is not controlling. The law is
well settled that statements on the return that it was prepared on
the cash or the accrual basis are not controlling if the facts indicate
328. The amount of the liability need not be definitely ascertained. Brown v.
Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 200 (1934); Dingle-Clark Co., 26 T.C. 782 (1956).
329. Commissioner v. Blaine, Mackay, Lee Co., 141 F.2d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1944);
Stern-Slegman-Prins Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1935); Bauer
Bros. v. Commissioner, 46 F.2d 874, 875 (6th Cir. 1931). And assumed a reason-
able expectancy of payment. Helvering v. Russian Fin. & Constr. Corp., 77 F.2d
324, 327 (2d Cir. 1935). This cannot be the case where the liability is contested
by the taxpayer. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 31 T.C. 1080 (1959).
330. Willoughby Camera Stores v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir.
1942); Cecil v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 896, 902 (4th Cir. 1939); Alexander H.
Kerr & Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 796, 799 (S.D. Cal. 1951). It does not
follow that on an accrual method receipt or payment is never important. C. H.
Mead Coal Co., 31 B.T.A. 190, 192 (1934) ; see Mark E. Schlude, 32 T.C. No. 124
(Sept. 28, 1959) ; Guantanamo & W.R.R., 31 T.C. 842 (1959).
331. Not infrequently the taxpayer's method of keeping his accounts may differ
from his method of reporting income. See Change of Accounting Method, supra
p. 30.
332. See Bowers, Tests of Income Realization, 16 Accounting Rev. 139, 154
(1941); Kohler, Accounting as Affected by Federal Income Taxation, 1 Taxes 5
(1923).
333. Squire v. Denman, 18 F. Supp. 287, 288 (N.D. Ohio 1936), aff'd, 111 F.2d
921 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Schuman Carriage Co., 43 B.T.A. 880, 887 (1941).
334. Presumably under 1954 Code, he may now in some cases employ a hybrid
basis. See supra note 154. A finding by the trial court that the accounts are kept
on a particular basis is controlling upon appeal. Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d 951
(10th Cir. 1950).
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otherwise.2 No presumption arises from the failure to state the
method upon which the return was prepared.33 6 The method actually
employed by the taxpayer to record the financial transactions of his
principal business activity is conclusive, 37 unless his intent is frus-
trated by an unskillful or incompetent bookeeper.3 38
Both the cash and the accrual methods of accounting are custom-
arily evidenced by the presence of certain account titles and certain
techniques in recording financial transactions. Such indices rarely
afford conclusive evidence, however. The presence in the accounts of
inventories, accounts receivable, accounts payable, accrued income,
and accrued expenses collectively constitutes a reasonable assurance
that the accrual method of accounting has been employed.3 39 Inven-
tories, receivables, and payables alone may suffice in some instances.3 40
The failure to accrue "minor" items of income and expenses 341 or to
335. Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahm, 282 U.S. 92, 99 (1930); Denman v.
Squire, 111 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1940); Consolidated Tea Co. v. Bowers, 19 F.2d 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1927); Bancroft v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1943);
Arrington's, Inc., 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 632 (1946); cf. Daley v. United States,
243 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 (1957) ; George L. Castner Co.,
30 T.C. 1061 (1958).
336. Davison-Joseph-Campau Realty Co., 41 B.T.A. 675 (1940). Failure to
state that a return was prepared on a fiscal year basis does not raise a presump-
tion of the calendar year. Bastrop Mercantile Co., 7 B.T.A. 529 (1927).
337. Diamond A Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1956).
338. Melville W. Thompson, 18 B.T.A. 1192 (1930); Russell G. Finn, 22 B.T.A.
799 (1931) ; cf. Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1950).
339. Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn 282 U.S. 92 (1930); Diamond A
Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1956), affirming 21 T.C. 1
(1953); Henry S. Parker, 11 B.T.A. 1336, 1346 (1928).
340. James J. Standing, 28 T.C. 789 (1956), aff'd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir.
1958); Sunset Color Works, 21 B.T.A. 304, 307 (1930); Wallace Plumbing Co.,
8 B.T.A. 1060 (1927); Green Oil Soap Co., 3 B.T.A. 467 (1926). But see Boca
Ceiga Dev. Co., 25 B.T.A. 941 (1932), rev'd on other grounds, 66 F.2d 1004 (3d
Cir. 1933).
341. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357, 360 (1930); see
United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 442 (1926). This is an obviously flexible
criterion. Compare Nibley-Minmaugh Lumber Co., 32 B.T.A. 791 (1935) (two
unimportant items of receivables and taxes) and Madison & Kedzie State Bank,
1 B.T.A. 922 (1925) (insurance only) with Coatesville Boiler Works, 9 B.T.A.
1242 (1928) (interest, insurance, taxes, work in process inventory) and John F.
Cook, 4 B.T.A. 916 (1926) (interest, insurance, salaries). See Lawrence L. Rector,
14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1116 (1945); Theodore Stanfield, 8 B.T.A. 787 (1927);
Max Schott, 5 B.T.A. 79 (1926). Does accrual or failure to accrue payroll taxes
spell the difference? Compare Merrimac Trading Co., 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 719,
aff'd per curiam, 162 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1947) with Thomas W. Briggs, 25 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 358 (1956).
Accrual of minor items does not constitute an accrual basis. Shoong Inv. Co.
v. Anglim, 45 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1942); Thomas W. Briggs, supra note 341;
L. W. Mallory, 44 B.T.A. 249 (1941).
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accrue items of expense which are paid as incurred 34 2 "cannot destroy
the principle upon which the system of accrual bookkeeping is
based." 343
But accounts are not, like mournful numbers, always what they
seem. Accrued income and expense accounts may not be inconsistent
with a cash basis of accounting, particularly if the accounts contain
no accruals for the taxable year under consideration.344 Accounts re-
ceivable and accounts payable do not always signify the presence of
the accruals of sales and purchases. The accounts may be mere
memoranda 45 or they may arise without any effect on income.34 0 "In-
extricably intertwined, ' 34 7 at least by administrative fiat,31 as the
accrual method and inventories may be, the use of beginning and end-
ing inventories does not necessarily require the conclusion that the
taxpayer is on the accrual basis.3 9
342. Hygienic Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, III F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1940);
Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 24 F.2d 230, 231 (N.D. Ohio 1927), aff'd,
282 U.S. 92 (1930); New McDermott, Inc., 44 B.T.A. 1035 (1941); Edwards Drill-
ing Co., 35 B.T.A. 341 (1937), aff'd, 95 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1938). It is not neces-
sary to set the items up only to knock them down again. Madison & Kedzie State
Bank, 1 B.T.A. 992 (1925); cf. C. Florian Zittel, 12 B.T.A. 675 (1928).
343. Bartles-Scott Oil Co., 2 B.T.A. 16, 18 (1925) ; see Coatesville Boiler Works,
9 B.T.A. 1242, 1255 (1928).
344. Benjamin I. Powell, 26 B.T.A. 509 (1932).
345. Paul Hansen, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 294 (1945); Cosmopolitan Bond &
Mortgage Co., 30 B.T.A. 717 (1934), appeal dismissed, 77 F.2d 994 (7th Cir.
1935); D. B. Dearborn, Jr., 2 B.T.A. 59 (1925).
346. Diamond A Cattle Co. v. Commissioner 233, F.2d 739 (10th Cir 1956);
Great Bear Spring Co., 12 B.T.A. 383 (1928); M. D. Rowe, 7 B.T.A. 903 (1927).
Inclusion of accounts receivable in income coupled with the deduction of the out-
standing balance at the end of each year is equivalent to the cash method. Arring-
ton's, Inc., 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 632 (1946). If the taxpayer records accounts
payable, but holds open the cash book at the end of each month until all accounts
have been liquidated, he is on a cash basis. A.R.R. 4802, 111-1 Cum. Bull. 77
(1924).
May a cash basis taxpayer have accounts receivable arising in the ordinary
course of business and still properly report income on the cash basis? See Daily
Record Co., 13 B.T.A. 458 (1928).
347. Boynton v. Pedrick, 136 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per curiam,
228 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1955). Inventories are the heart of the accrual system of
accounting. The term "inventory" system is generally recognized as synonymous
with the accrual system of accounting. Diamond A Cattle Co. v. Commissioner,
233 F.2d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1956).
348. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (2) (i) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958);
Treas. Reg. 118, §§ 39.22 (c)-1; 39.41-(a) (1953).
349. Glenn v. Kentucky Color & Chem. Co., 186 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1951), noted
65 Harv. L. Rev. 351 (1951); Mann v. Commissioner, 35 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
1929); Sam Greengard, 8 B.T.A. 734 (1927), aff'd, 29 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1928);
Theodore H. Beckman, 8 B.T.A. 830 (1927). Contra, Charles M. Kilborn, 29 T.C.
102 (1957); George L. Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061 (1958).
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Advocates and Adherents
In accounting the cash basis has been relegated to an uncertain
oblivion, to be used only in rare instances under rare combinations of
circumstances. In the federal income tax law the cash method has
continued to furnish the when-criteria for the great majority of tax-
payers. In both fields the accrual basis, despite certain inherent un-
certainties, has become the predominant method of the business enter-
prise.
The cash basis of accounting in recent years has been much criti-
cized and condemned O in accounting circles as a long-since outmoded
relic of the Paciolian era.3i In its "pure" form, it is not acceptable
as even an approximately reliable measurement of effort and accom-
plishment." It is the very antithesis of the avowed accounting aim
of matching costs and revenues.3 53 The nearest thing to a cash basis
which plays any important part in business enterprise today is that
modification embodied in the installment basis.3 5 In general, the cash
basis is limited in application to governmental and institutional ac-
counting,"' or to those rare instances in which all assets and liabilities
except cash are negligible in value or constant from period to period 56
A statement of income prepared on the cash basis does not customarily
merit an accountant's unqualified opinion.3 51
Deservedly by accounting theory or not, many historical, govern-
mental and practical influences combine to give cash receipts an im-
portant status as a measurement of income.35S As a criterion for the
350. The condemnation may be premature. The cash basis of accounting is a
relatively unexplored field of accounting theory, perhaps because it does not fit
conveniently into a neat, if in part unrealistic system. See Chambers, Blueprint
for a Theory of Accounting, 6 Accounting Research 17 (1955); Rabinowitz,
Treatment of Prepaid Expenses on the Cash Basis of Accounting, 15 Accounting
Rev. 474 (1940).
351. Chambers, supra note 350; 1 Moonitz & Staehling, Accounting Analysis
201 (1950); Kohler & Morrison, Principles of Accounting 166 (1926). Kohler,
Accounting Theory as Affected by Federal Income Taxation, Proc. Am. Ass'n Univ.
Instructors in Accounting 73 (1923) termed the cash basis even then "as rare as
single entry bookkeeping." Cf. Ferst, Basic Accounting for Lawyers 15 (1950),
who recommends its use "whenever possible."
352. Sanders, Progress in Development of Basic Concepts, Contemporary Ac-
counting 1-1, 1-17 (Leland ed. 1945).
353. See 1 Newlove & Garner, Advanced Accounting 402 (1950); Paton &
Littleton 59.
354. Sanders, supra note 352.
355. Ibid.; cf. Husband & Thomas, Principles of Accounting 117 (1935).
356. Holmes & Meier, Advanced Accounting 199 (1950).
357. See Hill, Problems Encountered by Accountant When Expressing an
Opinion on Cash-Basis Statements, 96 J. Accountancy 309 (1953).
358. Sanders, supra note 352.
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measurement of taxable income the cash method has enjoyed great
favor.3 59 It is, at least in theory, simple. 360 Receipt of cash corre-
sponds with the "commonest, common man's concept of income."3"1
Further, it does not require the taxpayer to pay taxes upon income
until it is actually received ;362 he can control to a large degree the
timing of his deductions.3 6 3 The cash basis of accounting requires no
books of account or very rudimentary ones.3 64 Income may be com-
puted without laborious apportionments and accruals of items of
income and expense so minor in amount as to fail to justify the labor
required.365 For these advantages many have been willing to forego
the more exacting measurements of accrual accounting. Wage
earners,8 6  farmers,367 professional men,3 68 and public accounting
firms369 are generally among its adherents.
The accrual basis of accounting, on the other hand, is the method
generally adopted by accountants3 0 as the standard method for the
359. But see Montgomery, Federal Tax Handbook 9 (1st ed. 1932): "It is
unfortunate that Congress or the Treasury permitted the cash basis for reporting
income to become fixed in our taxing system. The cash basis should be abandoned,
even at this late date." See also B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762, 766 (1925).
360. Application of the doctrine that the equivalent of cash is income renders
the determination of the realization of income almost as difficult as the accrual,
without full advantages of the latter. Magill, Taxable Income 192-93 (1945).
361. Fisher & Fisher, Constructive Income Taxation 116 (1924).
362. Receipt of income thus depends upon the vagaries of one's creditors.
Amory & Hardee, Materials on Accounting 29 (1953). The cash basis is most
often justified when the size and timing of collections from customers are highly
uncertain. 1 Moonitz & Staehling, Accounting Analysis 229 (1950).
363. If he is able to pay them. See Rolnik, Elections in the Income Tax Law,
N.Y.U. 6th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 748, 752 (1947); Ahern, Getting the Best Effective
Use Out of Accounting Methods and Accounting Periods, id. at 479, 493.
364. Magill, Taxable Income 178 (1945).
365. Ascher, Survey of Accounting 84; Husband & Thomas, Principles of Ac-
counting 117 (1935); Magill, Taxable Income 192-93 (1945).
366. Ferst, Basic Accounting for Lawyers 15 (1950).
367. See supra note 125. But see Gilman 114.
368. 1 Moonitz & Staebling, Accounting Analysis 229 (1950). Much of the
income of professional persons, independent businessmen, and farmers is known
only to the recipient, his secretary and God. Two of these parties are sometimes
corruptible, and the third has never been particularly concerned with income-tax
administration. Groves, Production, Jobs and Taxes 67 (1944).
369. The cash basis is useful in any enterprise in which the furnishing of
services, rather than goods is the primary activity. Services may be those fur-
nished over a short period of time, such as transportation and amusement, or
"complex services" furnished over a considerable period. See Paton & Littleton
57-59; Hill, supra note 357.
370. Becker v. United States, 21 F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1927).
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determination of income. 1 The business world would accept no
other. 1' Despite its greater virtues, it is not the perfect system of
accounting. Any method may be warped to unhappy results if applied
by untrained hands.; ; The use of the accrual basis requires the exer-
cise of a great amount of individual judgment, a matter over which
the minds of reasonable men may differ.3 74 In accounting, the criteria
of accrual have been left largely to the professional judgment of indi-
vidual accountants. ;,7 In the federal income tax law the accrual
method, reluctantly recognized by the courts,3 76 has become a com-
posite series of legal tests and standards for the measurement of
degrees of uncertainty. 7 7 The case law is not free from confusion
and contradiction."7 Questions of accrual, in large part matters of
accounting, are often the most difficult introduced in income-tax
administration. ,7
CONCLUSION
In the business environment in which they were created, accounting
and bookkeeping have served well their purpose. They have provided
the requisite techniques for the recording of financial transactions;
they have summarized the results of those transactions through the
media of financial statements. With an occasional assist from the
Securities and Exchange Commission, accounting has conveyed ac-
371. Amory & Hardee, Materials on Accounting 29 (1953); McFarland &
Ayars, Accounting Fundamentals 37 (2d ed. 1947); Wade, Fundamentals of Ac-
counting 29 (1951).
372. Boynton v. Pedrick, 136 F. Supp. 888, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per
curiam, 228 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1955).
373. In re Newman, 94 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1938).
374. Kaplan & Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC,
48 Yale L.J. 935, 942 (1939).
375. Largely at their insistence. See Gilman 23; May, The Choice Before Us,
89 J. Accountancy 206 (1950) ; Committee on Auditing Procedure, Generally Ac-
cepted Auditing Standards 50-51 (1954).
376. Magill, Taxable Income 450 (1945).
377. The rules for accrual may seem simple enough, but in endeavoring to apply
them one court was reminded of Captain Cuttle's famous dictum, "the bearings of
the observation lies in the application of it." The test is said to be "a practical one,
but when we see the different results different supposedly practical men get from
applying the same test, we plainly see that what to one practical mind seems
heresy, to another equally practical, seems doctrine ... ." Frost Lumber Indus. v.
Commissioner, 128 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir. 1942).
378. Costas v. Secretary of Fin., 220 F.2d 651, 654 (1st Cir. 1955).
379. Ibid.; see Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 Mich. L. Rev.
148 (1949); Note, Accrual: The Uncertain Concept of Certainty-A History of
the All Events Test, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 293, 306 (1954). Whatever the faults and
virtues of the two methods they have this in common: if consistently applied they
will yield approximately the same results in the long run. Ascher, Survey of
Accounting 463 (1952) ; Kester, Advanced Accounting 130 (3rd ed. 1941).
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curately to creditors and stockholders the fiscal information required
for the protection of their interests. The demands business has made,
accounting has in large measure met.
In the less familiar surroundings of the federal income tax law, the
capacity of accounting, perhaps as distinguished from that of ac-
countants, has been less evident. While the uncertainty of its status
under the early revenue acts seemingly was supplanted by the clear
declaration in the Revenue Act of 1918, the prescription that taxable
income be determined in accordance with the taxpayer's method of
accounting has not produced any lucid definition of the role of ac-
counting in the taxing process. To the contrary, methods of account-
ing have become almost exclusively, pure concepts of the law, subject
to the definition and discernment of the Commissioner and the courts.
Accounting as such, methods of accounting are not.
It seems unfortunate that the statute has been so circumscribed.
Yet the accounting profession is itself not without fault. Its failure
in 1918 and now to agree upon any accepted touchstones of income
determination and its insistence that income is to be determined by
each accountant in the exercise of his professional judgment do not
lend themselves to a workable basis of income tax assessment. The
events surrounding the creation and untimely demise of the prepaid
income and estimated expense provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code seem to indicate that, even now, the exercise of accounting's
professional judgment may leave something to be desired.
The legal and administrative interpreters of the law, on the other
hand, have sometimes failed to recognize that accounting, within the
framework of its accepted limitations, is capable of some greater
utility in the administration of the income tax laws. Because they
have found accounting lacking on some occasions, the courts and the
Commissioner are not therefore justified in arbitrarily assuming
that it is for naught upon all. Accounts kept in accordance with the
requirements of other governmental agencies should be entitled to
some status in the federal tax law, absent any patent deviations from
the norm. Likewise, the unqualified-opinion reports of recognized
public accounting firms will, it seems likely, in most instances reflect
accurately the results of the financial events which they chronicle.
The continuing conflict of accounting and law reflects not only the
inability of its practitioners to agree upon the broad policies most
beneficial to the taxpayers, but also the unwillingness of both ac-
countants and lawyers to look discerningly at the tools of their pro-
fessions. Mere boasting of the virtues of their own and the vices of
the other will not assist either. Nor does the answer lie in the indis-
criminate merger of law and accounting. Each has its function in the
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taxing process. Definition and division would seem to offer more than
coalescence and combination.
It may be that some day an easy solution to the conflicts of law and
accounting, and lawyers and accountants, will be found, thus resolving
the octopus tax law into amoeba simplicity. But it does not seem
likely. To so favor the multitude bespeaks a denial of private interest.
Of this are not most men made.
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